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INTRODUCTION

n 1942, Felix S. Cohen published the Handbook of Federal Indian Law,' the first synthesis of that field. At that time, Cohen
was renowned as a legal philosopher, a member of the American
t

Copyright 1987 by Stephen M. Feldman.
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1. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (1941) (facsimile edition 1971).
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legal realist movement, and a leading advocate for Native Americans. The primary purpose of this Article is to relate Cohen's realist jurisprudence to the development of federal Indian law. The
thesis is that Cohen's jurisprudence profoundly affected his writing of the Handbook, which, in turn, profoundly affected the development of contemporary federal Indian law. The United States
Supreme Court has effectively adopted Cohen's realist method for
resolving certain issues of federal Indian law. The Court has not,
however, adopted his ethical values on those issues. Thus, although Cohen was a recognized advocate for Native Americans,
the development of the law suggests that his realist methodology,
in some respects, undermined tribal sovereignty and Native
American rights.
Although this Article largely discusses Felix Cohen and federal Indian law, the discussion revolves around two general points.
First, jurisprudential ideology-ideas and theories on how to approach and resolve legal problems-can greatly influence the development of law in the courts. Second, this influence on law is
significant, often because of its ethical consequences. For example,
jurisprudential ideology sometimes concentrates on encouraging a
particular form of legal irgument, such as the realist method.
When this type of jurisprudential ideology influences the development of law, so that a particular form of argument is frequently
used, then the ideology is significant insofar as the form of argument has ethical consequences. Therefore, one should be wary of
ever discussing the form of an argument apart from its ethical
repercussions.
The first part of this Article describes Cohen's jurisprudence-his brand of realism. To appreciate the development and
texture of Cohen's jurisprudence, his thought is placed in an ideologicaI context by a brief discussion of the philosophical and jurisprudential culture of his time. The second part of the Article
turns to federal Indian law. Initially, there is a general discussion
of Cohen's Handbook of FederalIndian Law and a description of its
relationship to his realism. Then, to better illustrate the connections between his jurisprudence and the development of federal
Indian law, the Article focuses specifically on the scope of state
power in Indian country. Cohen's treatment of this subject in his
Handbook and the development of the law in this area are described in detail and related to his realism. Finally, the implica-
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tions and ironies of Cohen's work are discussed in the context of
the development of federal Indian law.
II.
A.

FELIX S. COHEN'S JURISPRUDENCE

Philosophical and JurisprudentialContext

To a large extent, Cohen's jurisprudential ideas were a product of his times. A brief summary of the philosophical and jurisprudential culture of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries reveals the historical contingency of Cohen's thought.
Because, as Max Radin noted, Cohen was first a philosopher who
later became an attorney,' I will begin with a description of the
philosophical context of Cohen's work.
The philosophy of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries developed largely in reaction to Hegel's idealism. Hegel
envisioned a world of an Absolute, and this Absolute is Reason
itself. Thus, for Hegel, the history of the world is the dialectical
development of the unfolding of Absolute Reason. Hegel believed
that the human mind is the vehicle of Absolute Reason reflecting
on itself; reality is, therefore, intelligible to the human mind.
Thus, for Hegel, an understanding of the categories of human
reason and thought is equivalent to an Understanding of the Absolute or reality.3
The philosophies that developed in reaction to idealism and
that had the greatest influence on Cohen were pragmatism and
analytic philosophy. In contrast to Hegel's high-minded idealism,
the pragmatists focused on facts, consequences, and action-they
were concerned with the relation of humans to their environ2. See Radin, Book Review, 47 HARv. L. REV. 145, 146 (1933) (reviewing F. COHEN,
ETHICAL SYSTEMS AND LEGAL IDEALS (1933)). Cohen received his A.B. from City College of
New York (CCNY) when he was eighteen. He wanted to attend law school immediately,
but his father, Morris Raphael Cohen, persuaded him to study philosophy first. Felix Cohen consequently received an M.A. in 1927 and a Ph.D. in 1929 from Harvard, and eventually published his philosophy dissertation, Ethical Systems and Legal Ideals. Cohen then
attended law school after receiving his Ph.D. See infra text accompanying notes 104-05.
Biographical information on Cohen is drawn from two sources: WASHINGTON, D.C., CHAPTER OF THE ALUMNI OF THE CITY COLLEGE OF NEW YORE, FELIX S. COHEN: A FIGHTER FOR
JuSTIcE

17 (1956) [hereinafter A

FIGHTER FOR JUSTICE];

Biography of Felix S. Cohen, 9

RUTGERS L. REV. 345 (1954) [hereinafter Biography].
3. G. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPmrr (A. Miller trans. 1977); see 7 F. COPLESTON, A
HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 2-10, 21 (1965); M. WHrFE, THE AGE OF ANALYSIS 13-21 (1955).
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ment. For example, C. S. Peirce argued that the meaning of an
intellectual conception is the sum of the practical consequences
that result from that conception. 5 Similarly, John Dewey argued
that thought is instrumental and can therefore be used to resolve
problematic situations. 6
Analytic philosophers, also in contrast to idealists, tended to
focus on discrete problems instead of attempting to create all-encompassing systems of the world.7 Bertrand Russell, one of the
leading analytics, described analytic philosophy as a process of reduction. A philosopher starts with a body of common knowledge
as data and then logically reduces this knowledge, expressed in
complex and interdependent propositions, to simple precise propositions, with certain initial propositions serving as premises for
deductive chains. If the logically implied premises, that are arrived at through the analytic process, are open to doubt, then the
philosopher has revealed that the common knowledge, which
served as the original data, is also doubtful.8
Just as the philosophy of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was a reaction to Hegel's idealism, the jurisprudence
of the early twentieth century was a reaction to Langdell's legal
science.9 The most salient components of Langdellianism, which
critics referred to as mechanical jurisprudence, 10 are formalism,
conceptualism, and autonomy. Formalism is the belief that law
4. William James wrote: "ideas (which themselves are but parts of our experience) become true just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with other parts of
our experience." James, Truth and Practice,in M. WHITE, supra note 3, at 164-65 (emphasis
deleted); see id. at 162-63; see also 8 F. COPLESrON, A HIs'rORY OF PHILOSOPHY 330-44

(1966).
5. See F. COPLESTON, supra note 4, at 310-11; 5 C. S. PEIRCE, COLLECTED PAPERS OF
CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE 1 9 (C. Hartshorne & P. Weiss ed. 1934); M. WHITE, supra note 3,

at 141-43; Peirce, How to Make Our Ideas Clear, in M. WHITE, supra note 3, at 143-53.
6. See F. COPLESTON, supra note 4, at 352-79; M. WHITE, supra note 3, at 175.
7. See Russell, A History of Western Philosophy, in M. WHITE, supra note 3, at 201. G. E.

Moore, another analytic philosopher, was particularly hostile to speculative metaphysics.
For example, Moore argued that philosophy can offer no more to support the truth of
some propositions related to everyday life than common sense can offer. Thus, philosophy
cannot offer additional support for the truth of the statement: "There are material
things." See F. CoPLEsroN, supra note 4, at 415-16; M. WHITE, supra note 3, at 190; Moore,
The Revival of Realism and Common Sense, in M. WHITE, supra note 3, at 27-43.
8. See F. COPLESTON, supra note 4, at 483-84; see, e.g., B. RussEL. & A. WHITEHEAD,
PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA (1910-1913) (discussed in F. COPLESTON, supra note 4, at 438).
9. See, e.g., C. LANGDELL, CASES ON CONTRACTS viii (1871); see also G. GILMORE, THE AGES

OF AMERICAN LAw 42-48 (1977) (discusses what Gilmore calls the age of faith).
10. See Pound, MechanicalJurisprudence,8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 605-07 (1908).
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consists of discoverable principles and rules that dictate results in

specific cases; thus, judges discover, and do not make, the law.
Conceptualism is the belief that principles and rules can be organ-

ized into a cohesive system, with the lower level rules following
logically from the basic principles. Autonomy, the final component, is revealed in the belief that law is a science to be treated
independently from other disciplines and from society.11 Thus,
the Langdellian approach focused on the logical development of a

system of law grounded on a few fundamental principles, with little regard for the realities of human experience.
The most significant reaction to Langdellianism was the development of American legal realism.1 2 The realists argued, contrary to Langdell, that law is not autonomous from society and
11. See Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1, 11-13 (1983); see also R.
POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAw 82-84 (1938). Despite the autonomy of law,
the Langdellian approach viewed law as functional-law fulfills the needs of society. See
Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REv. 57, 65-67 (1984).
12. The philosophies of Oliver Wendell Holmes and of the sociological jurisprudes
preceded realism as reactions to Langdellianism. Holmes' famous statement-"The life of
the law has not been logic: it has been experience"-summarizes his view of Langdell's
legal science. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). Holmes criticized the Langdellian
approach for focusing on logic as the sole force in the development of the law. See Holmes,
The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 465 (1897). Although, in Holmes' view, logic
supports judicial decisions and law can be generalized into a system that can help to predict
what the courts will do, a significant degree of inarticulate and unconscious judgment is
also part of any judicial decision. Id. at 457-58, 465-66. Further, Holmes believed that
judges have a duty to weigh the social advantages entailed in a decision, though he also
believed-somewhat inconsistently-that judges should exercise restraint instead of attempting to use their judicial power to shape society. Id. at 467. See D. HOLLINGER, MORRIS
R. COHEN AND THE SCIENTIFIC IDEAL 168 (1975). In other words, Holmes recognized that
judges make law, but he believed that this recognition implied that judges should not become "conscious agents of social reform." Id.
The sociological jurisprudes, including Roscoe Pound, criticized the Langdellian approach as ignoring justice in the pursuit of elegant legal systems. See Pound, The Theory of
Judicial Decision, 36 HARV. L. REV. 940, 940 (1923). Langdell was accused of transforming
judicial decision-making into mechanical jurisprudence. See Pound, supra note 10. The sociological jurisprudes argued instead that a preexisting rule does not govern every
case-judges must make law. See B. CARDoZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 10-11
(1921). Unlike Holmes, however, the sociological jurisprudes encouraged judges to engage
in social engineering, which was viewed as the ideal end of the law. Social utility was the
best guide for judges and legislators. See Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, supra, at
954-56. The sociological jurisprudes, however, did not ignore logic or legal precepts. Logic
was viewed as a significant factor in the shaping of the law, but it was not the end of the
law; the end was justice and social welfare. See B. CARDOZO, supra, at 30-31, 40-43, 65-66,
112-13; Pound, The Scope and Purpose of SociologicalJurisprudence, 25 HARV. L. REV. 489,
516 (1912). Thus, for the sociological jurisprudes, logic and rules remained significant, but
the instrumentality of the law gained increased importance.
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that abstract preexisting principles do not objectively dictate judicial decisions.1 3 Consequently, the heart of realism was the belief
that the study of law should be focused on concrete disputes and
on what officials at all levels do about those disputes.1 4 Realists
focused on factual realities, and, correspondingly, distrusted abstract legal rules, principles, and systems 5 The realist study of
law emphasized narrow categories that were analogous to realworld situations"' and largely focused on the accurate descriptions
of judicial behavior and the consequences of judicial decisions,
often from the7 perspective of social sciences such as psychology
1
and sociology.
Thus, both the philosophy and jurisprudence of Cohen's era
moved from a focus on pure reason and systematizing, with a disregard for the experiences of the "real" world, to a focus on consequences, facts, action, and instrumentalism. As early as 1880,
the relationship between the developing trends in philosophy and
jurisprudence had been recognized-Holmes wrote: "If Mr.
Langdell could be suspected of ever having troubled himself
about Hegel, we might call him a Hegelian in disguise ...... "18
Felix Cohen, as a philosopher and a jurisprude writing in the
13. See, e.g., K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 9, 12-14, 107-08 (1951). The views of
the realists overlapped with the views of the sociological jurisprudes on this point. See supra
note 12. Some realists also believed, in agreement with the sociological jurisprudes, that
law is instrumental because it can meet the evolving needs of society, see, e.g., Llewellyn,
Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARv. L. REV. 1222, 1236
(1931), but this belief was not universally accepted amongst the realists. For an overview of
the significance of the realist movement, see W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALiST MOVEMENT 375-87 (1973).
14. See K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 13, at 9, 12-14, 107-08.
15. See Llewellyn, supra note 13, at 1237; see, e.g., J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN
MIND 130 (1930).
16. See Llewellyn, supra note 13, at 1237.
17. See D. HOLLINGER, supra note 12, at 180; see, e.g., J. FRANK, supra note 15; Moore,
Rational Basis of Legal Institutions, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1923). Some realists also focused
on the significance of intuition and hunches in judicial behavior. See, e.g., J. FRANK, supra
note 15, at 104-06, 111; Radin, The Theory of Judicial Decision Or: How Judges Think, II
A.B.A. J. 357 (1925).
18. Book Review, 14 AM. L. REV. 233, 234 (1880) (reviewing C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION
OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, WITH A SUMMARY OF THE TOPICS COVERED BY THE CASES

(1879)) (although this book review was unsigned, it has been attributed to Holmes; see 2 M.
HOWE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE PROVING YEARS 155-57 (1963)). Morris Cohen later wrote that Holmes' discussion of the meaning of legal principles resembled
Peirce's pragmatic theory of meaning. M. COHEN, Justice Holmes and the Nature of Law, in
LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 198, 213 (1933) (first printed in 31 COLUM. L. REV. 352 (1931));
see supra text accompanying note 5.
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early twentieth century, naturally developed ideas similar to his
contemporaries. Cohen was particularly sympathetic to the analytical approach for philosophical questions and used it in his more
philosophical writing. For example, in his dissertation for his doctorate in philosophy, Ethical Systems and Legal Ideals, 9 Cohen did
an extensive "critical analysis" *ofethical systems 20 and repeatedly
cited and discussed the two leaders of the analytical movement,
G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell.2 1 Moreover, in his dissertation,
he occasionally criticized the pragmatists and never cited them
with approval.2 2 Nonetheless, pragmatism had a greater influence
than analytic philosophy on Cohen's legal writings. In fact, Cohen
essentially equated his jurisprudential approach with pragmatism,2" although the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham also clearly
affected Cohen's writing.2 4 In accord with those philosophical approaches, Cohen was a consequentialist and an instrumentalist. He
combined those elements in his legal realism. With regard to consequentialism, for Cohen, the meaning of any definition is its consequences; in other words, the meaning of a definition is the sum
of the human actions and effects that the definition causes.2 5 With
19. F. COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS AND LEGAL IDEALS (1933) [hereinafter F. COHEN, ETHiCAL SYSTEMs]. Ethical Systems is reviewed in Ayres, Book Review, 43 YALE LJ. 158 (1933),
Nelles, Book Review, 33 COLUM. L. REv. 763 (1933), and Radin, supra note 2. The introductory chapter of Ethical Systems was also published in the Yale Law Journal. See Cohen,
The Ethical Basis of Legal Criticism, 41 YALE L.J. 201, 201 n.* (1931).
20. See F. COHEN ETHICAL SYSTEMS, supra note 19, at 145-229; see also F. COHEN, What
is a Question?, in THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE 3 (1960) (applies analytic approach to the problem
of what is a question).
21. See, e.g., F. COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS, supra note 19, at 18, 23-24, 121 nn.4-5, 139
n.17 (focusing on Russell); id. at 130 n.10, 135-38, 140 n.18 (focusing on Moore).
22. See, e.g., id., at 5 n.6, 192-93 & n.53.
23. See, e.g., Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense and the FunctionalApproach, 35 COLUM. L.
REv. 809, 830 n.58, 838 (1935) [hereinafter Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense]; Cohen, The
Problems of a FunctionalJurisprudence, I MOD. L. REv. 5, 6-7 (1937) [hereinafter Cohen, The
Problems]; Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RuTGEaS L. REv. 357, 357 (1954) [hereinafter Cohen, Dialogue].

24. See J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION
IN THE ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS FROM BACON TO MILL 791-95 (E. Burtt ed. 1939) [hereinafter J. BENTHAM, MORALS AND LEGISLATION]; J. BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 1-4 (R.
Hildreth trans. 1864); see also infra notes 78-83 and accompanying text. Cohen characterizes Bentham's theory as a functional theory. See F. COHEN, Book Review, in THE LEGAL
CONSCIENCE 179, 181-82 (1960) (reviewing C. OGDEN, BENTHAM'S THEORY OF FICTIONS
(1932), and J. BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION (C. Ogden ed. 1931)) (first printed in
42 YALE L.J. 1149 (1933)).
25. See F. COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS, supra note 19, at 48-51; Cohen, The Problems,
supra note 23, at 15, 25-26; see, e.g., Cohen, Modern Ethics and the Law, 4 BROOKLYN L. REV.

486

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

regard to instrumentalism, Cohen wrote that the test of any definition is usefulness, not truth.2" More concretely, he wrote that
law is "the most powerful and flexible instrument of social con27

trol.

Law has instrumental power because it can promote the

"good life":2 8 thus, if law has value, it is as a social tool that positively affects the social order and the people in society.2 9
B.

Ethical Functionalism

Cohen can be categorized as an American legal realist with
an ethical twist.30 Although he often referred to his jurisprudential theory as functionalism,3 1 this label alone does not capture the
strong ethical flavor of Cohen's thought. A more appropriate label might be ethical functionalism, a label that he never used, but
one that nonetheless more accurately describes his theory. Cohen's major works reveal his dual emphasis on ethics and functionalism; his most significant writings in the field of jurisprudence are Ethical Systems and Legal Ideas,2 TranscendentalNonsense
3
and the Functional Approach, 3 and Modern Ethics and the Law. 4
The thrust of these works is a concern for an appraisal or ethical
criticism of law as it really is.
The essence of Cohen's jurisprudence lies in his twofold first
33, 50 (1934) (how to define justice) [hereinafter Cohen, Modern Ethics]; Cohen, Dialogue,
supra note 23 (the meaning of private property).
26. See F. COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS, supra note 19, at 12-13; Cohen, Transcendental
Nonsense, supra note 23, at 835-38.
27.

F. COHEN, ETHICAL SvSTS, supra note 19, at 1.

28. Id. at 17-18.
29.

See A FIGHrR FOR JusT CE, supra note 2, at 8; see also Cohen, Modern Ethics, supra

note 25, at 48.
30. Like many realists, Cohen's writing sometimes resembles the writing of some contemporary critical legal scholars. See, e.g., F. COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS, supra note 19, at 3537 (an infinite number of general rules can fit a case); Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense,
supra note 23, at 838 (attacks "apologists" for the existing social order). Cohen's jurisprudence has been recently discussed. See Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L.
REV. 1152, 1226-48 (1985).
31. See, e.g., Cohen, The Problems, supra note 23, at 5; Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense,
supra note 23. Cohen used the term "functionalism" differently from modern social scientists. See, e.g., T. PARSONS, A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession, in ESSAYS IN SocIOLoGiCAL THEORY 370 (Rev. ed. 1954) (using a functionalist approach, argues that attorneys are a
balancing mechanism in society because they mediate between the state and the citizens).
32. F. COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMs, supra note 19.
33. Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense, supra note 23.
34. Cohen, Modern Ethics, supra note 25.
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step. He separates the question of what law is from the question of
what law should be-he distinguishes fact from value. Yet, he recognizes and emphasizes that any judicial decision necessarily entails an ethical value judgment.3 5 This twofold approach allows
Cohen to isolate the two elements that occupy most of his jurisprudential writings and to underscore the necessary significance
of both elements: the functional element and the ethical element.
The functional element of Cohen's jurisprudence entails an
objective description of law. He seeks to analyze law as a function
of judicial behavior, to focus on how courts decide cases of particular kinds, and to emphasize the consequences of judicial decisions. The ethical element of Cohen's jurisprudence entails the
criticism of law. He seeks to appraise the law as a determinant of
human behavior and to suggest how courts should decide cases of
particular kinds. 6
Focusing first on the functional element, Cohen wrote that we
must use positive science to identify and organize the law before
we can criticize it.3 7 Positive science allows us to reduce law to its
consequences, to get the meaning of the definition of law from a
consequentialist approach. Thus, a functional analysis of a legal
rule is essentially a process of describing its consequences. 8
Cohen wrote that science can "throw light upon the real
meaning of legal rules by tracing their effects throughout the social order."' 9 For Cohen, therefore, we must scientifically test legal doctrines for their effects on human life. 40 Thus, Cohen did
not believe that law should be studied as an autonomous system;"1
instead, we should use psychology, economics, sociology, anthro35. See F. COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS, supra note 19, at 14-48; Cohen, Transcendental
Nonsense, supra note 23, at 849.
36. See F. COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS, supra note 19, at 249-50; E. GARLAN, LEGAL REALISM AND JUSTICE

(1941); E. HEXNER,

STUDIES IN LEGAL TERMINOLOGY

(1941); Cohen, The

Problems, supra note 23, at 7, 18; Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense, supra note 23, at 824,
841; Cohen, Book Review, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 807, 809 (1941) (reviewing H. CAIRNS, THE
THEORY OF LEGAL SCIENCE (1941) [hereinafter Cohen, Review of Cairns].
37. See F. COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS, supra note 19, at 43-45; Cohen,

Modern Ethics,

supra note 25, at 41.
38. See F. COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS, supra note 19, at 47-48; Cohen, The Problems,
supra note 23, at 15, 25.
39. Cohen, Modern Ethics, supra note 25, at 44 (emphasis deleted).

40. Id. at 46.
41. See F. COHEN,
supra note 36, at 807.

ETHICAL SYSTEMS,

supra note 19, at 235-37; Cohen, Review of Cairns,
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pology, and other sciences and social sciences to facilitate the
study of law.42 He asserted that careful investigation of a law or a
judicial decision can reveal its otherwise unforeseen effects and
that those effects often diverge from the purposes of the law or
the decision. In some of his writing, Cohen applied this scientific
approach to concrete problems. He did a pragmatic analysis of the
meaning of property," and he did an empirical study of summary
judgments in New York State to show what difference the summary judgment procedures made in actual civil litigation.4
Cohen argued that functionalism eliminates the legal fictions
that abound in judicial opinions; he referred to these fictions as
the transcendental nonsense of law. For example, the determination of where a corporation is located for jurisdictional purposes is
transcendental nonsense-instead of discussing where a corporation is located, a court should focus on the consequences of deciding where the corporation can be sued. Similarly, Cohen would
believe it absurd to hold that one cannot sue a labor union for a
tort because it is not a person. Cohen attacked the use of supernatural justifications for judicial decisions: courts should focus instead on social facts and reality and should recognize their role in
46
the distribution of wealth and power in society.
Cohen summarized functionalism as follows:
Functionalism, as a philosophy, may be defined as the view that a thing
does not have a "nature" or "essence" or "reality" underlying its manifestations and effects and apart from its relations with other things; that the nature, essence, or reality of a thing is its manifestations, its effects, and its
relations with other things; and that, apart from these, "it" is nothing, or at
most a point in logical space, a possibility of something happening?4
42. See F. COHEN, ETHICAL SYsTEMs, supra note 19, at 146, 271.
43. Id. at 66-67.
44. See Cohen, Dialogue, supra note 23.
45. See Cohen, A FactualStudy of Rule 113, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 830 (1932).
46. See Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense, supra note 23, at 809-14.
47. Cohen, The Problems, supra note 23, at 7. If Morris Cohen were critiquing his son's
functionalism, he might be tempted to attack it as nominalism. Morris Cohen, who was
aligned with the sociological jurisprudes, see supra note 12, and Roscoe Pound engaged in a

celebrated debate with the realists that was staged in the Harvard and Columbia law reviews of the early 1930s. See D. HOLUNGER, supra note 12, at 180-86; see, e.g., M. CoHEN,

Philosophy and Legal Science, in

LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER

219 (1933) (first printed in 32

COLUM. L. REV. 1103 (1931)) [hereinafter M. COHEN, Philosophy];M. COHEN, supra note 18;
Yntema, The Rational Basis of Legal Science, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 925 (1931). Morris Cohen
criticized the realists for, among other things, refusing to discuss metaphysical questions
and for not ultimately recognizing the metaphysical underpinnings of their theories. See M.
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Thus, Cohen concluded: "We shall concern ourselves not with the

truth or falsity of a doctrine but with the significance of function-

COHEN, The Place of Logic in the Law, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 165, 171-73 (1933)
(first printed in 29 HARV. L. REv. 622 (1915)) [hereinafter M. COHEN, The Place]; M. COHEN,
Philosophy, supra, at 221-23. The thrust of this criticism was Morris Cohen's accusation that
the realists were nominalists because they failed to acknowledge the reality of universals.
He attributed this failure of the realists to their falling prey to the fallacy of reification-regarding universals as separate things, see M. COHEN supra note 18, at 210, which
necessarily caused the realists, in Morris Cohen's view, to believe that abstractions or rules
could exist only in an individual skull at a particular time. See M. COHEN, Philosophy, supra,
at 221, 223.
Morris Cohen, therefore, argued that the realists were unable to accept any objectivity
of meaning because of their latent nominalism. See M. COHEN, supra note 18, at 211. Nominalism allowed the realists to maintain an atomistic conception of law that was reflected in
their view that law consists of isolated decisions, which are no more than judicial behavior.
See M. COHEN, Philosophy, supra, at 226. Thus, Morris Cohen argued, the realists were essentially irrationalists: they ignored the significance of logic in the law. See M. COHEN, supra
note 18, at 203, 216. Morris Cohen countered by arguing that the fact that we can communicate with each other necessitates the existence of a common world or "objectivity." Id. at
211. Judicial decisions are connected or related in accordance with the prevailing rules and
precedents, and these relations are somehow objective or universal. See M. COHEN, Philosophy, supra, at 226-27, 242; M. COHEN, The Place, supra, at 172-73.
Morris Cohen maintained that the realists' failure to recognize the significance of legal
rules and principles and their co~isequent focus on behavior caused them ultimately to be
conservative. If, as the realists argued, law consists of uniformities of behavior, then, according to Morris Cohen, we cannot criticize the law. See D. HOLLINGER, supra note 12, at
183. Morris Cohen believed that normative questions about the law are as important as the
realist descriptions ofjudicial behavior. Thus, ironically, one of Morris Cohen's major criticisms of the realists is the same as his major criticism of the Langdellian mechanical jurisprudes: they failed to recognize the need to discuss questions of what the law should be, as
opposed to what the law is. See M. COHEN, Law and Scientific Method, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL
ORDER 184, 189 (1933) (first printed in 6 AM. L. SC. REv. 231 (1928)) [hereinafter M.
COHEN, Law and Scientific Method]; M. COHEN, The Process ofJudicial Legislation, in LAW AND
THE SOCIAL ORDER 112 (1933) (first printed in part in 48 AM. L. REV. 161 (1914)); M. COHEN,
Philosophy, supra, at 232; M. COHEN, The Place, supra, at 178; M. COHEN, supra note 18, at
208, 218.
Morris Cohen's jurisprudence can be viewed as an attempt to balance delicately between the views of the mechanical jurisprudes and the views of the realists. Indeed, a constant striving for balance marked Morris Cohen's work, which was full of attempts to reconcile opposing forces or dualities of existence. See, e.g., M. COHEN, Reason and Nature, in
READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 615, 635, 696-99 (1951) [hereinafter
M. COHEN, Reason and Nature]; M. COHEN, The Place, supra, at 183; see also D. HOLLINGER,
supra note 12, at 79.
Felix Cohen manages to sidestep most of his father's criticisms in developing his philosophy of law. In fact, David Hollinger wrote that Cohen attempted to define functionalism
so that it would be consistent with his father's antifunctional metaphysics. See D. HOLLNGER, supra note 12, at 198 n.67. Furthermore, Felix Cohen defended Bentham's theory of
utilitarianism, which he had categorized as functionalism and had described in a manner
suggestive of his own theory, against a charge of nominalism. See F. COHEN, supra note 24,
at 182.
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alism as a methodologic principle. Functionalism as a method may
be summed up in the directive: If you want to understand something, observe it in action." 4
Cohen's functionalism is consistent with much of the realist
jurisprudence. He focused on the facts of judicial behavior as the
reality of law, and thus necessarily concerned himself with narrow
categories, not broad transcendental principles. Furthermore, he
argued that judges make, and do not discover, law. 49 And, of
course, he underscored the difference between law-in-books and
law-in-action. 0 Cohen believed that because judicial opinions
often mask the real decision of a case, 51 we must observe the degree of obedience to judicial decisions and, consequently, the actual results of those decisions, placing
less emphasis on the ab52
stract legal reasoning of the opinions.
An accurate functional description of the law is thus important for Cohen, but it is no more important than an ethical appraisal of the law. Functionalism is necessary, but it is necessary as
a precondition to a conscious ethical criticism of law. One must
first accurately describe the law through functionalism before one
can ethically assess the law. Cohen argued that a functionalist
description is necessary to avoid the type of circular arguments,
based on transcendental nonsense, that criticize legal rules in
purely legal terms.53
Cohen revealed his ethical concerns by repeatedly displaying
in his writings a strong compassion for people that is unusual in
48. Cohen, The Problems, supra note 23, at 8.
49. See F. COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS, supra note 19, at 31; Cohen, The Problems, supra
note 23, at 10-11; Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense, supra note 23, at 816.
50. See F. COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS, supra note 19, at 62-63,237.

51. Id. at 237.
52. Id. at 62-63.
Cohen criticized the sociological jurisprudes, see supra note 12, in particular Pound,
because they recognized that judges make law but they nonetheless wished to maintain the
illusion that judges discover it. Cohen wrote that Pound sought to continue the illusion to
reinforce the judges' sense of responsibility and the laypersons' sense of security. See F.
COHEN, Book Review, in THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE 177, 177-78 (1960) (reviewing J. FRANK,
LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930)) [hereinafter F. COHEN, Review of Frank]. Cohen's major
criticism of Pound and the sociological jurisprudes, however, was that they focus too heavily on the consequences of legal rules and consequently fail to recognize the significance of
ethical decisions in the law. See F. COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS, supra note 19, at 4-6 & nn, 6 &
9, 89-90; Cohen, The Problems, supra note 23, at 8-9; Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense, supra
note 23, at 8-9; F. COHEN, supra note 24, at 181.
53. See Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense, supra note 23, at 814, 847.
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academia. He consistently reminded his readers that human values
must be applied to disputes." In fact, Cohen stated that "ethical
values are inherent in all realms of human conduct, ' 55 and hence
all people are morally responsible for the consequences of their
56
action or inaction.
Cohen argued that we must counter the forces in modern society that undermine a concern for ethics. The rise of modern
commerce has allowed us to discover the stark differences in values among cultures, which suggests that ethics is a futile endeavor
and that all values are relative. Furthermore, while ethics had traditionally sought certainty, 57 the growth of modern science reveals
the limits of our knowledge and raises doubts about our beliefs.
Nonetheless, Cohen emphasized: "An ethics, like a metaphysics, is
no more certain and no less dangerous because it is unconsciously
held.""8
Thus, Cohen believed that we must discuss ethics. We must
recognize our tacit moral assumptions, whether we are dealing
with the social sciences as applied to law 59 or with a mechanical
jurisprudence that obscures the ethical character of every judicial
decision. 60 Cohen insisted that every judicial decision involves an
ethical choice. For example, the question, "Is there a contract?"
really asks whether there should be a contract, or more precisely,
whether one party should be liable for certain actions.6 1 Even
choosing what facts are relevant in a case is an ethical decision;
logic does not dictate which facts should be considered significant
54.

See, e.g., id. at 847-49; Cohen, Book Review, 32 COLUM. L. RaV. 1262, 1265-66

(1932) (reviewing L. BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1932)); Cohen, Book Review, 31
ILL L. REV. 1128, 1131-33 (1937) (reviewing E. EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE
SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (1936)) [hereinafter Cohen, Review ofEhrlich]. Cohen wrote that modern
ethics shows that values cannot be separated from the fullness of life: justice "can be de-

fined only in terms of the full set of human values, the things that men approve or enjoy
for their own sake." Cohen, Modern Ethics, supra note 25, at 50.
55. Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense, supra note 23, at 840.
56. See F. COHEN, Book Review, in THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE 466, 470 (1960) (reviewing
K. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCITY AND IrS ENEMIES (1950)) (first printed in 60 YALE L.J. 1443

(1951)).
57.

See Cohen, Modern Ethics, supra note 25, at 38-39.

58. F.

COHEN, ETHICAL

SYSTEMS, supra note 19, at 3. Interestingly, Cohen's belief in

the necessity of discussing ethics is reminiscent of Morris Cohen's insistence upon discussing metaphysics. See supra note 47.
59. See F. COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS, supra note 19, at 21-28.
60. See Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense, supra note 23, at 840.
61. Id. at 839-40.
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and which facts should be ignored. 62 Likewise, a court's determination of whether or not to follow precedent is an ethical decision. 3 Ultimately, every decision must be judged as good or bad
(or right or wrong), and that judgment is an ethical decision, not a
question of truth or logic.6 '
Cohen attempted to apply scientific method to ethics.65 He
wrote that science is "dynamically conceived as a process of verification": 66 science questions everything and has no dogma or selfevident principles.67 Summarizing scientific method, Cohen wrote:
"The two cardinal aspects of scientific method are (1) the logical
explication and systematic development of possible hypotheses,
and (2) the testing of these hypotheses
and implications in the
68
light of immediate observation.
Cohen argued that values are facts, though facts of a peculiar
sort. Scientific methodology could, therefore, be applied to those
facts (values).6 9 Cohen held that all fundamental ethical propositions are always subject to questioning: a science of ethics requires
us to consider possible alternative ethical propositions70 "in the
71
light of a systematic elaboration of the logical consequences" of
the various propositions. Cohen wrote:
Ultimately the [ethical] systems we thus derive must face the scientific test of
empirical confirmation. They must fit into our immediate moral observations just as a scientific physics must fit into our immediate physical observations .... But as the student of physics learns to distinguish what he actually
sees in the physical phenomena before him from a mass of improper expectations and inferences, so the student of ethics may hope to refine his ethical
observation by viewing the realm of abstract ethical possibilities and examin62. See F. COHEN, Judicial Ethics, in THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE 160, 169 (1960) (first
printed in 12 OHIO ST. LJ. 3 (1951)) [hereinafter F. CoHEN,Judicial Ethics]; Cohen, Modern
Ethics, supra note 25, at 43-44.
63. See F. COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS, supra note 19, at 33.
64. See id. at 28-33; see also Cohen, The Problems, supra note 23, at 7, 24-25.
65. See F. COHEN, ETHICAL SYsTEms, supra note 19, at 113-27; Cohen, Modern Ethics,
supra note 25, at 42. Attempting to apply scientific method to almost everything was, of
course, quite common when Cohen was writing. For example, Peirce and Russell also said
that ethics was a science. See F. COPLEsTON, supra note 4, at 318-19, 472.
66.

F. COHEN, ETHICAL SysTass, supra note 19, at 118.

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

See
Id.
See
See
Id.

id. at 117.
at 124.
id. at 116.
id. at 120-21.
at 121.
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ing the interconnection of propositions in that realm.

Most importantly, however, even a moral law that satisfies the scientific test of empirical confirmation must always be subject to
doubt; all moral laws are constantly refined and brought closer to
73
"truth.
Finally, Cohen warned that we should not expect to find one
correct ethical theory or system.7 4 Indeed, late in his career, Co-

hen argued for an ethical theory analogous to the relativity theory
in physics. Cohen referred to this ethical theory as "field theory"
and intended it to coordinate different ethical judgments of the
same event. Cohen, in other words, acknowledged that different
ethical systems exist, but he theorized that the various systems
were somehow related, so that different ethical judgments of the
same event could be understood as judgments from different ethical systems. Field theory could relate the different ethical systems
and, therefore, could relate the opposed or distorted ethical judgments. 5 Cohen thus believed in an ethical theory with a changing
content.7 6
Cohen made an initial attempt to develop an ethical system
that could be applied to legal problems. In Ethical Systems and Legal Ideals, he extensively analyzed possible standards of legal criticism and argued, but was unable to prove, that the concept of the
"good life" is most probably the proper ethical basis for legal criticism. 7 7 Cohen then argued, but once again was unable to prove,

that hedonism is most probably the proper criterion for determining goodness:78 '"the standard of the good life has been most adequately formulated by the theory of hedonism ....

"

Similarly,

Cohen wrote: "For a legal criticism which finds in happiness the
72. Id. (footnotes deleted).
73. See Cohen, Modern Ethics, supra note 25, at 42.
See F. COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS, supra note 19, at 125-27.
75. See F. COHEN, Field Theory andJudicialLogic, in THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE 121 (1960)
(first printed in 59 YALE L.J. 238 (1950)) [hereinafter F. COHEN, Field Theory]; F. COHEN,
Judicial Ethics, supra note 62, at 168-69. Morris Cohen had suggested in 1932 that legal
science should operate with "fields" to relate different elements of the law. See M. COHEN,
Philosophy, supra note 47, at 228.
76. See F. COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS, supra note 19, at 146, 291.
77. See id. at 54-112.
78. See id. at 184-229.
79. Id. at 228. Max Radin wrote that Cohen's "hedonism could describe a life of virtuous self-denial as readily as the voluptuous frenzy of Sardanapalus." Radin, supra note 2, at
147.
74.
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substance of all valid moral judgment, it is the task of positive science to link the ceremonial show of the legal process with the joys
and sufferings of sentient beings." 80
Cohen's ethical hedonism is a form of utilitarianism, and he
relied heavily on Bentham in developing his theory.81 Cohen asserted that "the only things which are intrinsically good are things
(experiences) which contain a pleasure surplus .... "82 Elaborating
on the meaning of pleasure, Cohen wrote:
In the first place, the word [pleasure] is not restricted to the so-called
"lower" pleasures, but includes all sorts of pleasure, such as the pleasures of
aesthetic contemplation, self-discipline, altruism, and metaphysical argument. In the second place, pleasure does not mean the absence of desire or
the absence of pain, as the absence of pleasure during sound sleep should
show. In the third place, pleasure is not identical with the fulfillment of desire. We have all experienced unpremeditated, accidentally achieved
pleasures, and on the other hand, things we seek frequently prove to be nonpleasurable.8

Cohen's ethics, in conjunction with his functionalism, allowed
him to conclude that law is an instrument or social tool that
should be used to promote the good life.84 Ethics defines the good
life. Functionalism reveals the consequences of laws and judicial
decisions and allows one to predict future consequences. Thus,
one can direct the law to cause future consequences in accord
with the good life.
Cohen's emphasis on ethics distinguishes him from many
other realists. Cohen himself separated the realists into two
groups: a "right wing" and a "left wing." The right wing realists,
such as Thurman Arnold, focused solely on judicial behavior, re80. F. COHEN, ETHICAL SYsTEMs, supra note 19, at 231. As might be expected, Cohen
favored equalization of wealth within society. See id. at 79. But Cohen noted that equality
and liberty might sometimes be inconsistent, and thus, interestingly, Cohen believed that
liberty might have to be restricted in the pursuit of the good life. See id. at 79, 83. Cohen
also believed that hierarchy is inevitable in any social structure. See id. at 73-74.
81. Bentham was a hedonistic utilitarian. He argued that we should seek to increase
pleasure as opposed to increasing the satisfaction of preferences or desires. See J. BENTHAM,
MORALS AND LEGISLATION, supra note 24 at 791-95; J. BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION,
supra note 24 at 1-4. Cohen cited Bentham and discussed utilitarianism repeatedly in his
work. See, e.g., F. CoHEN, ETHICAL SYsTEMs, supra note 19, at 43-54. But see id. at 131-32
(rejecting some utilitarian terminology). Cohen also argued that sociological and realistic
jurisprudence are based on Bentham's theories. See F. COHEN, supra note 24, at 179-81.
82. F. COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEms, supra note 19, at 185.
83. See id. at 186.
84. See id. at 17-18; Cohen, Modern Ethics, supra note 25, at 48.
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jected the importance of all rules and principles, and essentially
denied ethics. For the right wing, realism had become a justification for the status quo. The left wing realists, on the other hand,
used the functionalist approach to strip the gloss from legal decisions in order to morally scrutinize the decisions as they really
were.8 5 Cohen clearly fell into the left wing, and emphasized ethics more than any other realist, perhaps because of his background in philosophy.
The above discussion of ethics reveals that Cohen did not reject the possibility or importance of systematizing "knowledge."
Cohen believed that ethical propositions can be systematized, but
one must remember that the propositions and the system are always subject to scientific inquiry.88 Likewise, Cohen did not reject
the possibility or value of systematizing the law. Such a systematization would not demonstrate what judicial decisions are "incorrect" and would not dictate the results in cases, but it would identify the diversity in a legal order or system. 7 Cohen further
argued that the systematic connections between judicial decisions
are what give any one decision its meaning.88
Nonetheless, Cohen argued that any systematic analysis of law
should not treat law as an autonomous subject. Instead, such an
analysis must recognize the importance of both functionalism-through the social sciences-and ethics.8 9 These aspects of
the law must be a part of any system. 0 Cohen summarized with a
warning that systematizing the law does not establish its value:
85. See F. COHEN, Book Review, in THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE 442, 446-47 (1960) (reviewing T. ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM (1935)).
86. See supra text accompanying notes 69-75; see also Cohen, Modern Ethics, supra note
25, at 41.
87. See F. COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS, supra note 19, at 236.
88. See id. at 239-40. Morris Cohen had made a similar point. See supra note 47.
89. See F. COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS, supra note 19, at 238-39.
90. Cohen wrote:
Can we find any formula to collocate the relevant considerations in the task of
tracing the reaction between any element of law and the rest of the legal order?
Any such formula must take account of at least five factors: (1) The personal
moral reactions of individuals to whom the administration of law is entrusted
towards the substance of the particular legal element; (2) The professional sense
of loyalty to the purpose of the original legal element; (3) The accuracy of the
modes by which that purpose is transmitted and apprehended; (4) The professional thought-ways which bring different legal elements to mutual relevancy;
and (5) The distribution of power within the realm of law administration.
Id. at 240-41.
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Jurisprudence, as the study of the reactions between any part of the dynamic
legal order and the rest of that order, is relevant to every valuation of law
which is directed to less than the whole law. Its subject matter is not rules of
law in prepositional vacuum but the field of judicial conduct. It seeks to discover systematic relations of cause and effect within that field and in this task
it is continually dependent upon psychology and general anthropology. Such
a legal science does not become a normative science by reason of dealing
with invocations to morality, any more than anthropology becomes religion
by dealing with men's religious attitudes. It assumes its place in the valuation
of law as an instrument for the accurate location of a legal element in the
context of its systematic jural significance.91

Cohen further argued that systematizing the law is important
because legal rules and principles unquestionably affect decisions.
For example, rules and principles tend to control the personal biases of judges when they decide cases because the judges tend to
respect their predecessors, who are in a sense reflected in the systematized precedent.92 Thus, Cohen admitted that even when the
rules and principles are the myths of transcendental nonsense,
they often impress the memories and imaginations of attorneys
and judges. 93

In a broader sense, Cohen argued that the way we systematize
the law-the categories of thought we create-affects our perceptions of law and the meanings we attach to law. If, for example,
testamentary disposition is categorized as a property right, then a
limitation on testamentary disposition would be viewed as a threat
to other property rights and would probably cause great insecurity. On the other hand, if testamentary disposition is distinguished from property rights, as is94typically the case, then a limitation on it will not be as alarming.
Cohen's belief in the value of systematizing further differentiates him from many other realists. Cohen criticized realists who
viewed the law atomistically95 and who claimed that judicial decisions are merely based on hunches. 98 Cohen argued instead that
decisions are not all uncertainty and discretion. 97 To Cohen, a ju91. Id. at 249.
92. See id. at 242.
93. See Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense, supra note 23, at 812.
94. See F. COHEN, ETHICAL SYsTEms, supra note 19, at 282-83; see also id. at 86 (thought
and expression affect society).
95. See Cohen, Review of Ehrlich, supra note 54, at 1134.
96. See Cohen TranscendentalNonsense, supra note 23, at 842-43.
97. See F. COHEN, Review of Frank, supra note 52, at 179.
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dicial decision is a social event.98 Furthermore, he believed that
"'actual experience does reveal a significant body of predictable
uniformity in the behavior of courts. Law is not a mass of unrelated decisions nor a product of judicial bellyaches." 9 9 In other
words, Cohen tended to be more conceptualistic than most other
realists. 0 0
Looking to the future, Cohen summarized his ethical
functionalism:
[Tlhe really creative legal thinkers of the future will not devote themselves,

in the manner of Williston, Wigmore, and their fellow masters, to the taxonomy of legal concepts and to the systematic explication of principles of "jus-

tice" and "reason," buttressed by "correct" cases. Creative legal thought
will more and more look behind the pretty array of "correct" cases to the
actual facts ofjudicial behavior, will make increasing use of statistical meth-

ods in the scientific description and prediction ofjudicial behavior, will more

and more seek to map the hidden springs of judicial decision and to weigh
the social forces which are represented on the bench. And on the critical
side, I think that creative legal thought will more and more look behind the
traditionally accepted principles of "justice" and "reason" to appraise in eth-

ical terms the social values at stake in any choice between two precedents. 10 1

III.

REFLECTIONS OF FELIX S. COHEN'S JURISPRUDENCE IN FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW

The thesis of this section is that Cohen's unique brand of
realism is manifested in his Handbook of FederalIndian Law,10 2 that
the Handbook has had a tremendous affect on the development of
much of federal Indian law, and that, therefore, some parts of
federal Indian law reflect unusually strong realist tendencies,
often arguably to the detriment of tribes and Native Americans.
This section begins with a brief history of how Cohen came to
write the Handbook and then discusses, in general, how the Handbook reflects Cohen's realism. This general discussion is then expanded upon with a detailed illustration in one of the most important areas of contemporary federal Indian law-the scope of state
98. See Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense, supra note 23, at 842-43.
99. Id.
100. Interestingly, just as Felix Cohen tended to be more conceptualistic than other
realists, Morris Cohen tended to be more formalistic than other sociological jurisprudes.
See D. HOLLINGER, supra note 12, at 178.
101. Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense, supra note 23, at 833. See Frankfurter, Foreword
to F. COHEN, THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE at xiv (1960) (summarizes Cohen's thought).
102. F. COHEN, supra note 1.
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power in Indian country. 03 Focusing specifically on this area, the
approach of the Handbook, and then the development of the law,
is described and related to Cohen's realism. Finally, this section
concludes with a discussion of the implications and ironies of Cohen's work in the context of federal Indian law.
A.

The Handbook of Federal Indian Law

1. How Cohen Came to Write the Handbook. Cohen graduated from Columbia Law School in 1931 and worked for a year as
a research assistant to a New York State trial judge.' 0 ' Cohen then
entered private practice, but, in 1933, he accepted a one-year appointment in Washington as an Assistant Solicitor in the Department of Interior. Cohen, however, remained in government service in that city for fourteen years, until he retired in 1948.
During his time in Washington, Cohen was involved heavily
in Indian affairs. In 1939, he was appointed as a Special Assistant
to the Attorney General to conduct an Indian law survey by the
Department of Justice. With his friend and colleague, Theodore
H. Haas, plus a staff of forty-seven members and contributors, Cohen compiled a forty-six volume collection of federal laws and
treaties relating to Native Americans. Based on this study, Cohen
prepared the Handbook, which was published in 1942.105
When Cohen began working on the Handbook, there had
been a century and a half of legal developments concerning Native Americans: over 4,000 treaties and statutes and thousands of
judicial decisions and administrative rulings already existed.1 0
"Indian law was understandably perceived by lawyers, judges, and
legislators as a mass of loosely connected rules without a center of
coherent principles.' 10 7 Thus, with no previous synthesis of fed103. See infra note 125; see, e.g., California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 54
U.S.L.W. 3717 (U.S. April 17, 1986) (California appealed from holding that state gambling laws did not apply on reservation and that therefore tribe could operate bingo and
gambling parlor), appealing, Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. County of Riverside, 783
F.2d 900 (9th Cir. 1986).
104. Biographical information on Cohen is drawn from two sources: A FIGHTER FOR
JUSTICE, supra note 2; Biography, supra note 2.
105. See F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW xxviii (1982 ed.); Biography,
supra note 2, at 348.
106. See F. Cohen, supra note 105, at vii; Ickes, Foreword to F. COHEN, supra note 1, at
XiX.

107. F.

COHEN,

supra note 105, at vii.

1986]

FELIX S. COHEN

499

eral Indian law into a "field,"' 0 8 Cohen undertook the needed
task of systematic analysis of the subject area. 0 9 Felix Frankfurter
wrote:
Only a passionate desire to vindicate our democratic professions would have
led anyone to undertake the forbidding task of bringing meaning and reason
out of the vast hodge-podge of treaties, statutes, judicial and administrative
rulings, and unrecorded practice in which the intricacies and perplexities,
the confusions and injustices of law governing Indians lay concealed. Only a
ripe and imaginative scholar with a synthesizing
faculty would have brought
10 °
luminous order out of such a mish-mash.

The analytical synthesizing of a field of law is an odd task for
a realist: it sounds more like the work of a Langdellian formalist.
Thus, for example, the realists often criticized the American Law
Institute's Restatement movement of the 1920s, which attempted
to encourage uniformity in the law by synthesizing subject areas
into "restatements.""' In fact, Cohen wrote: "The age of the
classical jurists is over ....
The 'Restatement of the Law' by the
American Law Institute is the last long-drawn-out gasp of a dying
tradition. The more intelligent of our younger law teachers and
students are not interested in 'restating' the dogmas of legal

theology. "112
Cohen, however, was not a typical realist. Two unique aspects
of his realism-his belief in the value of systematizing and his ethical concerns-fueled his creation of the Handbook. As discussed
above, Cohen believed that law can be systematized, but only from
a functionalist approach, and not with trans'cendental nonsense." 3
Cohen wrote:
The realistic author of textbooks will not muddy his descriptions of judicial
behavior with wishful thinking; if he dislikes a decision or line of decisions,
he will refrain from saying, "This cannot be the law because it is contrary to
sound principle," and say instead, "This is the law, but I don't like it," or

more usefully, "This rule leads to the following results, which are socially
108. See id.
109. See Margold, Introduction to F. COHEN, supra note 1, at xxviii.
110. Frankfurter, Foreword, 9 RUTGERS L. REv. 345, 356 (1954).
111. See D. HOLLINGER, supra note 12, at 179. Karl Llewellyn, however, was the chief

draftsman for the Uniform Commercial Code-which was also a strange task for a realist.
See J. WHITE & I SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
3-6 (2d ed. 1980); Danzig, A Comment on theJurisprudenceof the Uniform Commercial Code, 27
STAN. L. REV. 621 (1975).
112. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense, supra note 23, at 833.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 86-99.
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Cohen's strong ethical concerns were apparent in his sensitivity to the differences between cultures and in his consistent concern for minorities, especially Native Americans.115 He believed
strongly that tribes should govern themselves, and that the majority society should not force its notion of expert government onto
the tribes. 116 Cohen expressed his ethical sentiments in his Acknowledgments to the Handbook:
What has made this work possible, in the final analysis, is a set of beliefs that
form the intellectual equipment of a generation-a belief that our treatment
of the Indian in the past is not something of which a democracy can be
proud, a belief that the protection of minority rights and the substitution of
reason and agreement for force and dictation represent a contribution to
civilization, a belief that confusion and ignorance in fields of law are allies of
despotism, a belief that it is the duty of the Government to aid oppressed
groups in the understanding and appreciation of their legal rights .... 117

2. General Approach and Organization of the Handbook. A
biographical pamphlet about Cohen, published by City College of
New York (CCNY), stated that he practiced what he believed and
argued."1 8 This aspect of Cohen's personality is evident in his
Handbook. Cohen's approach in the Handbook reflects the two major strains of his realism: ethics and functionalism.
Cohen's ethical concerns have already been noted above as
one of the factors that prompted him to write the Handbook-Cohen's concern for Native Americans reflected his concern for ethics.119 Essentially, Cohen recognized an overriding
ethical question in federal Indian law: Does the majority society
owe, as a matter of justice, a special moral duty to protect and aid
114. Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense, supra note 23, at 841.
115. See F. COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTE.MS, supra note 19, at 266, 278, 283-85, 289; F. CoHEN, Americanizing the White Man, in THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE 315 (1960) (first printed in 21
THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR 177 (1952)); A FIGHTER FOR JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 8-9; Biogra-

phy, supra note 2, at 348-49; Cohen, Review of Ehrlich, supra note 54, at 1131, 1133.
116. See F. COHEN, Indian Self-Government, in THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE 305 (1960) (first
printed in 5 THE AMERICAN INDIAN 3 (1949)); F. COHEN, Colonialism:A Realistic Approach, in
THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE 364, 367-69 (1960); A FIGHTER FOR JUsrICE, supra note 2, at 12-13;
Cohen, Indian Rights and the Federal Courts, 24 MINN. L. REV. 145, 147-84 (1940).
117. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at xxxii.
118. See A FIGHTER FOR JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 8, 12-13.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 115-17. See generally F. COHEN, Judicial Ethics,
supra note 62, at 162-64 (Indian land cases involve basic ethical questions).
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Native American tribes as compensation for past and present societal injustices, including violent coercion and psychological duress? Cohen's affirmative answer to this question is expressed in
the specifics and in the flavor of the Handbook, which indicate his
support for Native Americans in their efforts to maintain their
cultures and their independence.
In the Foreword to the Handbook, Secretary of Interior Harold L. Ickes wrote that the purpose of the Handbook was to empower Native Americans and to avoid their oppression.1 20 And, in
an article published after the Handbook, Cohen, with eloquent sarcasm, criticized the Supreme Court for sometimes ignoring the
ethical component inherent in federal Indian law cases:
[Before Europeans came] to North America, this country was claimed by
Indians who thought they owned it. Ever since the arrival of the first white
immigrants, they have been devoting some of their finest legal talents to discovering defects in these Indian titles and, in that way, devising justifications
for the removal of land, minerals, and timber from Indian ownership to
white ownership, in the interest of progress. One of the most brilliant and
ingenious justifications of this process is that which is given by Justice Jackson in his concurring opinion in [the] Northwest Shoshone case. He advances the theory that Indians were really communists, who did not understand or appreciate property rights. Ownership of land, he says, "meant no
more to them than ... sunlight and the west wind, and the feel of spring in
the air. Acquisitiveness, which develops a law of real property, is an accomplishment only of the civilized." It follows, then, that the United States being civilized, is under no legal obligation to pay Indians when it takes away
their homes, their timber, their fisheries, their water power, or anything else
that might be needed for railroads, canneries, pulp companies, or other progressive organizations that appreciate property rights. In advancing this theory that civilized people have the right to relieve less civilized people of their
possessions, Justice Jackson insists that the moral and the legal have nothing
to do with each other. He says specifically, referring to moral deserts [sic]
and legal rights, "we do1 not
mean to leave the impression the two have any
21
relation to each other.f

Ultimately, Cohen wanted the Handbook to reduce the number of
instances, in the area of federal Indian law, where the courts and
administrators ignored the ethical realities and implications of
their decisions.
Cohen approached the subject matter of federal Indian law
120. See Ickes, supra note 106, at xix.
121. F. COHEN, JudicialEthics, supra note 62, at 162-63 (quoting Northwestern Bands
of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 335, 358 (1945)).
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through the functional method, focusing on actual behavior and
consequences. In the Introduction to the Handbook, the Interior
Solicitor, Nathan R. Margold, wrote:
History and analysis need to be supplemented by an understanding of the
actual functioning of legal rules and concepts, the actual consequences of

statutes and decisions. Language on statute books, in the field of Indian law
as in other fields, frequently has only a tenuous relation to the law-in-action
which courts and administrators and the process of government have derived from the words of Congress. The words of court opinions frequently
have as tenuous a relation to the actual holdings. Magic "solving words" like
"Indian title," "wardship," and "competency," are often used to establish
connections, between a case under consideration and some precedent, that
turn out on reflection to be purely verbal. Functional study of the federal
Indian law in action is essential
to a work that may serve the practical pur12
poses of administrators.

Except for a brief final paragraph on Cohen's experience,
Margold concluded the Introduction to the Handbook with a long
quotation from one of Cohen's jurisprudence articles, appropri123
ately entitled The Problems of a FunctionalJurisprudence.
Cohen attempted to systematize the field of federal Indian
law by concentrating on factual situations and consequences of decisions and by minimizing his reliance on "transcendental nonsense." Applying a broad functional perspective to the problems
of the field, Cohen wrote that an "understanding of the law, in
Indian fields as elsewhere, requires more than textual exegesis, [it]
requires appreciation of history and understanding of economic,
1 24
political, social, and moral problems."
Cohen's approach is best illustrated by focusing on one area
of federal Indian law.12 5 In this manner, the broad organization of

122. Margold, supra note 109, at xxviii.
123. See id.; Cohen, The Problems, supra note 23.
124. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at xxxii; see Frankfurter, supra note 10, at 356. Cohen
focused on the significance of history to federal Indian law in an article published in the
same year as the Handbook. See F. COHEN, The Spanish Originof Indian Rights in the Law of the
United States, in THE LEGAL CONsCIENcE 230 (1960) (first printed in 31 GEo. LJ.1 (1942))
[hereinafter F. COHEN, The Spanish Origin]. And, in an article published after the Handbook,
Cohen revealed an interesting functional approach by discussing how the choice of words
by the courts can tend to disparage Native Americans. See F. COHEN, Field Theory, supra
note 75, at 149-51; see also F. COHEN, The Vocabulary of Prejudice, in THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE

429 (1960).

125. As mentioned earlier, the area that will be focused on is the scope of state power
in Indian country, which today is one of the most important areas in federal Indian law. See
F. COHEN, supra note 105, at x; Feldman, Preemption and the Dormant Commerce Clause: Im-
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the Handbook as well as the internal structures and content of Cohen's arguments are more easily explored and related to his
realism.
B. An Illustration: State Power in Indian Country
1. The Handbook of Federal Indian Law: State Power in Indian Country. A scan of the "Analysis of Chapters," which is a
detailed table of contents in the Handbook, hints at the tenor of
Cohen's approach: a focus on narrow factual categories, not broad
principles. Although one chapter is entitled "The Scope of State
Power Over Indian Affairs," several other chapters also deal with
that subject. One chapter focuses on taxation, another focuses on
civil jurisdiction of courts, and a third focuses on criminal jurisdiction. Each of these chapters contain sections that deal with state
1 26
power over Indian affairs.
The structure within the chapter entitled "The Scope of
State Power Over Indian Affairs" is most instructive. It begins
with an introduction and then has a section on federal statutes
that relate to state power. This latter section has two subsections:
the first relates to general federal statutes that empower the states
in Indian country, and the second relates to more specific federal
statutes.1 27 The next section is the most significant in terms of
demonstrating the influence of Cohen's realism-it is entitled
"Reserved State Powers Over Indian Affairs." ' 8 Cohen breaks
this section into seven subsections that are based on specific and
narrow factual situations: he isolates "situs, person and subject
matter"11 9 in his scheme of organization. Thus, the first subsection is entitled "Indian outside Indian country engaged in nonfederal transaction."180 The second is "Indian outside Indian
country engaged in federal transaction."131 The third is "Indian
plicationsforFederalIndian Law, 64 OR.L. REv. 667 (1986); Comment, The Developing Tests
for State Regulatory Jurisdictionin Indian Country: Application in the Context of Environmental
Law, 61 OR. L. REv. 561 (1982); supra note 103.
126. See F. COHEN, supra note 1, at xxxiii-xxxviii; see also id. at 116 n.1 (in chapter
entitled "The Scope of State Power Over Indian Affairs," the first footnote states that
specific bodies of state law are dealt with in other chapters).
127. See id. at xxxiv, 116-19.
128. See id. at xxxiv, 119.
129. Id. at 119.
130. Id. at xxxiv, 119.
131. Id.
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within Indian country engaged in non-federal transaction. '13 2
The fourth is "Non-Indian outside Indian country engaged in federal transaction."133 The fifth is "Non-Indian in Indian country
engaged in federal transaction. 113 4 The sixth is "Non-Indian in

Indian country engaged in non-federal transaction." ' The final
subsection is a summary.
Cohen breaks down the other chapters on state power with
similar detail and focus on narrow factual categories. 3 ' In fact,
the chapter on criminal jurisdiction has sections that correspond
1 7
closely with the subsections outlined in the previous paragraph.
The thrust of this description of the Handbook is that its organizational structure is typically realist. It emphasizes specific factual categories corresponding to real-world situations. In this organization, Cohen displays an aversion towards an organization
based more on abstract general principles-in Cohen's words,
1 8a
there is a dearth of formalistic "transcendental nonsense."
With respect to content, Cohen begins the introduction to the
chapter entitled "The Scope of State Power Over Indian Affairs"
by stating a general proposition that state laws have no force
within Indian country in matters affecting Native Americans. 13 '
He finishes the introduction by asserting two exceptions to this
general proposition: courts can uphold state jurisdiction that affects Native Americans only if either: (1) Congress has expressly
delegated to or recognized in a state the power to govern Native
Americans, or (2) a question that involves Native Americans also
"involves non-Indians to a degree which calls into play the jurisdiction of a state government.1 14 0 Additionally, when Cohen be-

gins the section on reserved state powers over Indian affairs, he
restates the vague second exception: a state has power "where the
matter involves non-Indian questions sufficient to ground state jurisdiction. 1
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

41

Cohen then explores the six factual categories

Id. at xxxiv, 120.
Id.
Id.
Id. at xxxiv, 121.
See id. at xxxvi-xxxvii.
See id. at xxxvii, 358-65.
See Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense, supra note 23.
See F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 116.
Id. at 117.
Id. at 119.
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based on situs, person, and subject matter. 42
The vague second exception could be called, in a sense, a
general principle, but perhaps it is better categorized as a loose
standard. 13 In other words, Cohen is not stating or synthesizing a
transcendental principle of federal Indian law that courts could
rely upon when deciding cases (to whatever extent courts can ever
rely upon transcendental principles). Rather, Cohen essentially invites the courts to focus on the concrete factual circumstances of
each individual case. He thus encourages case-by-case analysis with
a focus on the narrow facts of each particular case, which is likely
to require a balance of interests, such as when a court applies a
1 44
reasonableness test.
Another excellent illustration of how the Handbook reflects
Cohen's realism is found in the chapter on taxation. When Cohen
discusses the taxing powers of the states, his approach is either to
state a fact-oriented rule and then to expend a tremendous
amount of space on a case-by-case march through the judicial decisions relating to that rule, or to start with an extensive case-bycase march through the decisions and then to conclude with a
fact-oriented rule. For example, Cohen begins the section on state
taxation of personal property of Native Americans with a statement of a fact-oriented rule:
Wherever personal property is acquired by or for tribal Indians for use on
Indian reservation lands in connection with or in furtherance of the policy
adopted by the Government in encouraging the Indians to cultivate the soil

and to establish permament [sic] homes and families, or otherwise aid in
their economic rehabilitation, such property may not be taxed by the
145
state.
142. See id. at 119-21.
143. See generally Katz & Teitelbaum, PINS Jurisdiction,the Vagueness Doctrine, and the
Rule of Law, 53 IND. L. REV. 1 (1978) (discusses differences between specific rules and broad
standards); Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685
(1976) (same); Schlag, Rules and Standards,33 UCLA L. REv. 379 (1985) (same).
144. Cohen restates the general proposition regarding state power over Indian affairs
and the two exceptions in the summary to this section of the chapter, but, his restatement
is as loose and typically realist as before. He writes:
The foregoing sections may be summarized in two propositions: (1) In matters
involving only Indians on an Indian reservation, the state has no jurisdiction in the
absence of specific legislation by Congress. (2) In all other cases, the state has jurisdiction unless there is involved a subject matter of specialfederal concern.
F. COHEN, supra note I, at 121 (emphasis in original).
145. Id. at 262.
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Cohen then continues with a detailed case-by-case discussion of
the subject, using excessively long quotations from the cases.14
Thus, the content as well as the structure of Cohen's arguments is typically realist. Cohen does not make a great effort to
synthesize the cases in an attempt to withdraw some overriding
principle to supposedly govern them. That type of approach
would lead to transcendental nonsense; therefore, he focuses on
factual realities and on what the courts are actually doing. To the
extent that Cohen does "synthesize" the cases, he utilizes a functional approach to emphasize the factual circumstances of the particular cases and the consequences of the judicial decisions. One
could, therefore, say that Cohen systematizes the field of federal
Indian law, but does not synthesize the cases into formalistic rules
1 47
or principles.
2. The Development of the Law: State Power in Indian Country. The seminal case relating to state power in Indian country1 4
146. Id. at 262-63; see also id. at 258-59.
147. In an article published in the same year as the Handbook, Cohen did state that
there are four basic principles of federal Indian law: (1) the principle of the legal equality
of races; (2) the principle of tribal self-government; (3) the principle of federal sovereignty
(as opposed to state sovereignty) in Indian affairs; and (4) the principle of governmental
proteetion of Indians. See F. COHEN, The Spanish Origin, supra note 124, at 232. These four
principles were also stated by Nathan R. Margold in the Introduction to the Handbook. See
Margold, supra note 109, at xxiii-xxv. Nonetheless, these principles were expressed in the
body of the Handbook more as a perspective of Cohen than as transcendental principles
governing the field of federal Indian law. Cohen approached this field largely with the
perspective that the federal government should protect tribal cultures and encourage selfgovernment; the principles were the foundation of that perspective. Cohen did not rely on
these principles as transcendental principles justifying particular judicial decisions.
148. Congress defined Indian country in 1948:
[T]he term "Indian country," as used in this chapiter, means (a) all land within
the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States
government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rightsof-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities
within the borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of
a State, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been
extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1982). Congress enacted this definition as part of a criminal code, but the
Supreme Court has extended the definition to civil jurisdiction cases. See DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975); see also Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713,
715 n.1 (1983).
Indian country can be recognized by general federal actions such as treaties, statutes, or
executive orders. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 133 n.I (1982); D.
GETcHEs, D. ROSENFELT. & C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 296 (1979).
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is Worcester v. Georgia,149 decided in 1832. In Worcester, the state of
Georgia had convicted non-Indians of a state crime that had been
committed on the Cherokee reservation. Chief Justice Marshall
wrote for the Supreme Court, which held:
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can
have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but
with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties,
and with the acts of Congress.150

Thus, the Worcester Court, while invalidating the state convictions, established a broad principle: state laws were absolutely
barred on Indian reservations. 151 The source of this bar was unclear, though the Court discussed both federal power over Indian

affairs and inherent tribal sovereignty, suggesting that they were
each possible sources.

52

In any event, the Worcester doctrine, bar-

153
ring state power on Indian reservations, remained largely intact

until 1881, when United States v. McBratney'5 held that a state had
criminal jurisdiction over a non-Indian who had murdered another non-Indian in Indian country.
The next seventy-eight years-in the midst of which the
Handbook was published-produced a confused development in
the field of state power in Indian country, with the Court failing
to develop any clear or consistent doctrine. 55 Some early cases
149. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
150. Id. at 559-61.
151. The Court extended the doctrine of Worcester, which involved state criminal jurisdiction, to state civil jurisdiction also. See, e.g., The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 217
(1866) (state could not tax lands belonging to an Indian tribe).
152. See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 552, 557, 559-61. Tribal sovereignty is inherent, not
derived from the powers of the federal government. See United States v. Wheeler, 435
U.S. 313, 322-30 (1978); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896). The problems caused
by the ambiguity in Worcester relating to the source of the bar to state power is discussed in
Feldman, supra note 125.
153. Some early cases with highly unusual circumstances allowed state power to extend somewhat into Indian country. See, e.g., Langford v. Monteith, 102 U.S. 145 (1880)
(process could be served within a reservation for a suit in territorial court between two
non-Indians); New York ex rel. Cutler v. Dibble, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 366 (1858) (state law,
which prohibited non-Indians from settling or residing on Indian lands, did not conflict
with federal law because it protected the Native Americans).
154. 104 U.S. 621 (1881). McBratney is criticized in P. MAxFIELD, M. DmmicnH, & F.
TRELEASE, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW ON AMERICAN INDIAN LANDS 81-82 (1977).
155. A good example of the Court's inconsistent approach to the area of state power
in Indian country involves the federal instrumentality doctrine. For a period of time, the
Court relied on the federal instrumentality doctrine to prevent states from taxing the activ-
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upheld jurisdiction. For example, in 1885, the Court upheld a
state tax on non-Indian fee land located within a reservation, 1 6
and in 1898, the Court upheld a state property tax imposed on
the cattle of non-Indian lessees who had been grazing the cattle
on leased reservation lands.1 57 But, in some later cases, the Court
barred state jurisdiction. In 1921, the Court held that a federal
statute and Department of Interior regulations concerning inheritances barred the application of state inheritance laws to Native
Americans."' Likewise, in 1924, the Court held that a state law
that required both spouses to execute a lease was repugnant to
federal law when applied to Native Americans.1 59
In 1959, the Supreme Court decided Williams v. Lee, 60 a
landmark decision that clarified the scope of state power in Indian
country to an extent unsurpassed since Worcester had been in full
flower. In Williams, a non-Indian brought a civil action against a
Native American to collect for goods sold on credit on a reservation. The Court reviewed Worcester and the subsequent cases, 61
and then articulated a test: "Essentially, absent governing acts of
Congress, the question has always been whether the state action
infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own
laws and be ruled by them." 162 The Court held that state civil jurisdiction was barred because it would infringe upon tribal selfgovernment. 6 3 Thus, Williams identified two barriers to state
power: "governing Acts of Congress," and infringement on tribal
sovereignty. The latter barrier came to be referred to as the Williams infringement test.
The Court shifted its emphasis in 1973 when it decided McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission,'" in which the state
sought to tax a Native American for income earned on the reserities of non-Indians who leased mineral lands in Indian country, see Choctaw & Gulf R.R. v.
Harrison, 235 U.S. 292 (1914), but the Court then rejected that doctrine and upheld state
taxes on the activities of non-Indian mineral lessees, see Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas
Co., 336 U.S. 342, 365 (1949).
156. Utah & N. Ry. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28 (1885).
157. Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898).
158. Blanset v. Cardin ex re. Daylight, 256 U.S. 319, 324, 326 (1921).
159. Sperry Oil v. Chisholm, 264 U.S. 488, 497 (1924).
160. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
161. Id. at 218-20.
162. Id. at 220.
163. Id. at 223.
164. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
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vation. The Court reviewed Worcester and Williams 65 and then
stated: "Finally, the trend has been away from the idea of inherent Indian sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward
reliance on federal pre-emption." 68 The Court held that the
treaty, which recognized the reservation, and the applicable federal statutes preempted state law. 167
McClanahanwas significant for several reasons. Although earlier cases had applied the doctrine of preemption,"'8 McClanahan
was the first federal Indian law case to expressly use the word
"pre-emption." Moreover, the Court's analysis in McClanahan
clarified the aspects of Indian preemption that were similar to and
different from other fields of preemption law. Like other preemption analyses, Indian preemption focused on congressional in69 In Indian preemption cases, however, a traditional backtent.Y
drop of tribal sovereignty 170 and canons of construction applicable
only to statutes and treaties related to Native Americans increased
the likelihood that a court would hold that Congress had intended
to preempt state law. 171 Furthermore, the Court moved to resolve
an ambiguity still lingering from Worcester: was federal power or
inherent tribal sovereignty the source of the bar to state power in
Indian country? McClanahan clearly focused on federal power in
the form of federal preemption, which is primarily grounded in
the supremacy clause of the federal Constitution.1 7 ' Nonetheless,
the ultimate relationship between Williams and McClanahan re165. Id. at 168-72.
166. Id. at 172.
167. Id. at 173-78.
168. See, e.g., Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965)
(comprehensive federal regulatory scheme left no room for state to impose additional burdens on licensed non-Indians trading with Indians on a reservation).
169. See, e.g., id.
170. See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 376 n.2 (1976); McClanahan v. Arizona
State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).
171.

See Wilkinson & Volkman,Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As Long as

Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth"--How Long a Time Is That?, 63 CAUF. L. REv.
601, 608-23 (1975); see, e.g., Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima
Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 484 (1979); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411
U.S. 164, 174-75 (1973); Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 41213 (1968).
172. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl.
2; see De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976); Florida
Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrTIONAL LAW § 6-23 (1978).
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mained to be clarified. 7 3

The Court radically altered the Williams infringement test in
1980, when it decided Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville.17 4 The state of Washington sought to tax the on-reservation
sales of cigarettes to nonmembers of the tribes.1 7

The tribes

owned and operated the smoke shop that sold the cigarettes and
also imposed a tribal tax on the sales. The Court restated the infringement test: "The principle of tribal self-government . . .
seeks an accommodation between the interests of the Tribes and
the Federal Government, on the one hand, and those of the State,
on the other."176 Thus, to determine whether state law applied in
Indian country, the Court would weigh federal and tribal interests
against state interests. The Court had changed the infringement
test into a balancing test.
i The Court similarly modified the Indian preemption analysis
in White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,1 77 decided later in 1980.
The state of Arizona sought to impose its motor carrier license
and use fuel taxes on non-Indian corporations, that had contracted with a tribal timber enterprise to perform logging operations on the reservation. The Court stated that there are "two
independent but related barriers"178 to state power in Indian
country: federal preemption and infringement of tribal sovereigniy. 79 The Court began its preemption analysis consistently

with the traditional notions of Indian preemption law-focusing
on congressional intent in light of the backdrop of tribal sovereignty and the canons of construction. 8 But, the Court continued by stating that it must make a "particularized inquiry" into
173. See Feldman, supra note 125.
174. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
175. The Court distinguished tribal members from non-Indians and Native Americans
on the reservation who were not members of the tribes. See id. at 160-61.
176. Id. at 156; see id. at 161. McClanahan had been the first case to mention state
interests as a legitimate consideration in the context of a dispute involving state power in
Indian country. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 171, 179
(1973). Three years after McClanahan, the Supreme Court held that a state law imposed
only a "minimal burden" on the Native Americans and thus did not frustrate tribal selfgovernment or congressional enactments. Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes
of Flathead Indian Reservation, 425 U.S. 463, 481-83 (1976).
177. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
178.

Id. at 142.

179. Id.
180.

Id. at 143-44.
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the state, federal, and tribal interests."' 1 Thus, although conclud-

ing that federal law governing Indian timber harvesting left no
room for state regulation, the Court nonetheless weighed
the fed18 2
eral and tribal interests against the state interests.
Thus, White Mountain was significant for two reasons. First, it
clarified the relationship between the Williams infringement test
and the McClanahan preemption analysis: they are two independent but related barriers to state power. Second, White Mountain
apparently changed the Indian preemption analysis into a balancing test similar to the one that Colville had used with the infringement analysis.
Although White Mountain might have left some doubt about
the approach to be used in an Indian preemption analysis," 8 subsequent cases erased all ambiguities. In New Mexico v. Mescalero
Apache Tribe,'" the Court stated: "State jurisdiction is pre-empted
by the operation of federal law if it interferes or is incompatible
with federal and tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless the
state interests at stake are sufficient to justify the assertion of state
authority."' 85
Thus, in summary, the Court in Worcester began with a clear
and absolute bar to state power in Indian country, based arguably
on federal power and tribal sovereignty. Over the next 127 years,
the Court modified the Worcester doctrine, though without clear
analytical articulation, until the Court announced the Williams infringement test. Then, the Court in McClanahan explicitly identified a second bar to state power: federal preemption. Subsequent
cases clarified these two bars as independent but related barriers
to state power, but also changed the two bars into balancing tests.
Thus, in any case arising today, to determine the scope of state
power in Indian country, a court must balance federal and tribal
interests against state interests. Each case must essentially be approached ad hoc, with a particularized inquiry into its narrow concrete facts.
These changes in the law regarding state power in Indian
181. Id. at 145.
182. Id. at 145-50.
183. See Feldman, supra note 125, at 676 n.54.
184. 462 U.S. 324 (1983).
185. Id. at 334; see Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983); Ramah Navajo School Bd.
Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of N. M., 458 U.S. 832 (1982).
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country have heralded in greater and greater state incursions into
Indian affairs.18 6 For example, in Colville, the Court allowed the
state to apply its sales tax to all nonmembers of the tribes who
bought cigarettes at the tribal smoke shop. Moreover, the Court
allowed the state to require the tribes both to collect the tax and
to keep records of all sales, including nontaxable sales to tribal
members. Even further, the Court held that the state could enforce its sales tax by seizing tribal cigarette shipments before they
187
reached the reservation.
More recently, in Rice v. Rehner,8 8 the Supreme Court held
that Congress had delegated authority to the State of California
permitting the State to regulate liquor sales by a federally licensed
Indian trader who was operating a general store on an Indian reservation. Rice was extraordinary because the Court of Appeals had
actually held that federal law preempted the state regulations.
The Supreme Court, however, by focusing heavily on the specific
facts of the case and on state interests, found that Congress had
not preempted but had instead authorized state law. Without
question, decisions like Colville and Rice would have been nearly
impossible to justify without the advent of the ad hoc and factspecific balancing test.
3. Relationship Between the Handbook and the Development of
the Law. Cohen's approach in the Handbook to the problem of
state power in Indian country reflected the functional component
of his realism. He focused on narrow concrete factual situations,
and when he did synthesize the cases to some limited extent, he
typically articulated a loose standard that invited a case-by-case
analysis tailored to the narrow factual circumstances of each situation. He did not rely upon transcendental principles as bars to
state power in Indian country. 89
The law addressing the problem of state power in Indian
country 'has developed from the once clear and absolute bar of
Worcester to the traditional infringement and preemption analyses,
and now to the present standard that requires a balance of interests-a typically realist approach to the issue. The law today re186.
187.
188.
189.

See Feldman, supra note 125; see, e.g., Rice, 463 U.S. 713 (1983).
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville, 447 U.S. 134, 159-62 (1980).
463 U.S. 713 (1983).
See supra text accompanying notes 126-47.
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quires a particularized inquiry into the narrow concrete facts of

each case. Since no broad and clear principles govern the cases, a
case-by-case analysis is necessary. 190
The realist approach of Indian preemption law is particularly
evident when it is compared with preemption in other fields.
Originally, Indian preemption developed similarly to preemption
in other fields in that the focus of both analyses was the discovery
of congressional intent. Indian preemption differed only because
tribal sovereignty served as a significant backdrop to the analysis
and because special canons of construction affected the interpretation of congressional acts related to Native Americans. Thus, preemption was more likely to be found in an Indian preemption case
than in a case from another field. 1"
With preemption analysis in other fields, the Supreme Court
has steadfastly maintained its traditional approach of searching for
congressional intent, 192 despite frequent criticisms and suggestions
that it move toward an approach of balancing state interests
against federal interests. 3 Yet, in Indian preemption cases, the
Court has wholeheartedly adopted a balance of interests test,
though it still pays lip-service to congressional intent. Thus, the
development of Indian preemption unmistakably reflects a realist
influence-in particular, Cohen's realist influence-whereas preemption in other fields has maintained a more formalistic
approach.
With the courts making a particularized inquiry into the interests at stake in each case, the continuance of legitimate tribal
sovereignty is largely at the whimsical sway of political pressures:
in any particular case, a court can reach the decision that is best
for the majority of society at that time. Needless to say, states and
state governments represent many more people and wield considerably more economic and political power than tribes or tribal
governments. Further, the sovereign powers of the states are
much more clearly defined than the powers of most tribes-the
190. See supra text accompanying notes 148-87.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 169-71.
192. See Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978); Douglas v. Seacoast
Products, 431 U.S. 265, 272 (1977); California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 731 (1949); Feldman, supra note 125.
193. See Feldman, supra note 125, at 687 n.107; see, e.g., Freeman, Dynamic Federalism
and the Concept of Preemption, 21 DE PAUL L. Rav. 630, 639 (1972); Hirsch, Toward a New
View of FederalPreemption, 1972 U. ILL L.F. 515, 537-38.
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sovereignty of the states is to a great extent constitutionalized in
both the federal and state constitutions. 94 Thus, the balance of
interests test is likely to allow the states to extend their power further and further into Indian country and over Native American
affairs. Moreover, every extension of state power entails a corre19 5
sponding weakening of tribal sovereignty.
One certainly cannot prove that the Handbook has alone
caused the law to develop along this realist path. Nonetheless, an
examination of the Handbook reveals that it reflects Cohen's realism, and the description of the present state of the law regarding
state power in Indian country reveals that it too reflects a similar
realist approach. Thus, one can reasonably conclude that the
Handbook has significantly influenced the development of the law.
Besides the descriptive similarities between the Handbook and
the development of the law, another factor strongly suggests that
the Handbook has heavily influenced the development of the law in
this field. Namely, the Handbook has had a tremendous affect on
all aspects of federal Indian law. It has been cited often, and even
when not cited, it has influenced how attorneys and judges approached Indian law cases. For example, in 1956, Chief Justice
Warren stated that Cohen was "an acknowledged expert in Indian
law," 1 16 and then quoted and followed the Handbook.19 7 Felix
Frankfurter wrote: "His Handbook of Federal Indian Law established Felix Cohen as the unrivaled authority within the field. It
became the vademecum of all concerned with its
problems-administrators, legislators, lawyers, friends and exploiters of Indians. It was an acknowledged guide for the Supreme
Court in Indian litigation."1 98
This argument is not intended to suggest that the Handbook
was the sole cause of the development of the law along a realist
194. See Feldman, supra note 125.
195. See generally Comment, supra note 125, at 578-87 (discusses the possible implications of a balancing test in the context of disputes involving environmental law).
196. Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1956).
197. Id. at 9.
198. Frankfurter, supra note 101, at xiii; see A FIGHrra FOR JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 9.
A computer search revealed that the Supreme Court cited the first edition of the Handbook
thirteen times from 1942 to 1958. See, e.g., Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956); TeeHit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955); Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co., 337
U.S. 86 (1949); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342 (1949); Creek Nation
v. United States, 318 U.S. 629 (1943).
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path-five other factors and their relationships to the Handbook
and the law are worth noting. First, an obvious factor is that realism was a powerful movement in American law that significantly
influenced the development of many fields. 199 Second, the membership of the Supreme Court at any particular time certainly affected the decisions made during that time. Third, the tenor of
feeling toward Indian affairs influenced decisions: congressional
policies towards Native Americans have fluctuated wildly over the
years, ranging from policies actively seeking to terminate tribes to
policies promoting tribal survival and self-government. 20 0 Fourth,

the nature of the field of Indian law, manifested in several ways,
may have influenced the development of the field. For example,
focusing on the area of the scope of state power in Indian country, when Cohen wrote the Handbook, the once clear Worcester
doctrine was in shambles and an essentially unrelated mass of
cases constituted that area of the law. This state of the development of the law probably affected how Cohen wrote the Handbook
and how the Supreme Court subsequently developed the area.
Also, federal Indian law is a unique field because it encompasses
almost all fields of law-criminal law, taxation, trusts, and many
other fields. Thus, synthesizing federal Indian law presents an unusually difficult task. Fifth and finally, the development of the law
has been influenced by the subsequent editions of the Handbook.
The Handbook was reissued three times. In 1958, the Department
of Interior revised and republished the Handbook. In 1971, the
American Indian Law Center and the University of New Mexico
republished the original Handbook in facsimile form. Again in
1982, the Handbook was revised and republished by a board of editors, composed of current Indian law scholars. These subsequent
publications make the task of tracing the effect of the original
Handbook more difficult, but a brief exploration of the circumstances surrounding the subsequent editions suggests that the
199. See W. TWINING, supra note 13 at 375-87 (overview of the significance of the realist movement). Twining wrote: "Few jurists, few practising lawyers, and few academic lawyers have consciously and openly opposed the proposition that it is desirable to adopt a
broad perspective and consider the law in its social context." Id. at 382.
200. Compare H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 99 CONG. REQ 9968 (1953)
(Congress adopted a "termination" policy) with Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n (1982). See generally F. COHEN, supra note
105, at 47-206; S. TYLER, A HISTORY OF INDIAN PouIcy (1973); Comment, supra note 125, at
561 & nn.24.
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original is of unquestioned importance.
The original 1942 edition had been published under the auspices of the Department of Interior. Subsequent to its publication,
however, official government policy towards Native Americans
shifted dramatically towards an anti-Indian policy of termination. 01 The original Handbook was therefore an embarrassment to
the government. Consequently, the Department of Interior rewrote the Handbook, publishing the new edition in 1958.202 This

new version reflected the changed governmental approach towards Indian affairs; it focused more on the plenary power of the
federal government over Native Americans and it downgraded
tribal sovereignty. 0 In fact, the Introduction to the 1958 edition
expressly stated that it was published "for the purpose of foreclosing, if possible, further uncritical use of the earlier edition by
judges, lawyers, and laymen.'

'2 4

In response to an increasing demand, the American Indian
Law Center and the University of New Mexico published, in
1971, a facsimile of the original Handbook.20 5 Then in 1982, a

board of editors rewrote the Handbook to account for the considerable changes that had occurred in the field since 1942.200 The
approach in the 1982 edition was much more sympathetic to Cohen's outlook and to tribal sovereignty than the 1958 edition had
been. Indeed, the Introduction to the 1982 edition 207rejected the
1958 edition as an unscholarly piece of propaganda.

Over the years, attorneys, judges, and administrators have not
been relying solely on the original Handbook and its 1971 facsimile
201. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
202.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (1958) [hereinaf-

ter DEPt. OF INTERIOR].

203. See F. COHEN, supra note 105, at ix. Philip S. Deloria wrote about the 1958
edition:
Tribal power and tribal abilities are downgraded; a preoccupation with federal
power over the tribes is evident; Cohen's description of history is mitigated
without specific disagreement or citation to opposing authorities. Where Cohen
sees the tribes as sovereign peoples, entitled to self-government and responsible
for their own destinies, the 1958 edition tends to see them as thorns in the side
of the American system of government.
F. COHEN, supra note 1, at xviii (Publisher's Note).
204. DEPr. OF INTERIOR, supra note 202, at 1.
205.

F. COHEN, supra note 1.

206. See F. COHEN, supra note 105, at ix-xi (the story of the writing of the 1982
edition).
207. See id. at ix.
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edition; they have also been relying on the 1958 and 1982 editions.2 08 Because of this varied reliance, one might question the
importance of the original to the development of federal Indian
law. Nevertheless, several reasons demonstrate that the original
Handbook has unquestionably and significantly influenced the development of the law.
The original edition became the standard reference book in
the field long before any subsequent editions were published.
Thus, the approach of many people to the problems of federal
Indian law was already shaped when the subsequent editions were
published. Additionally, the original Handbook significantly influenced the form and content of the subsequent editions in two
ways. First, a review of the subsequent editions reveals that they
were modeled after the original. For example, the chapter in the
1958 edition on the scope of state power over Indian affairs is
almost identical to the same chapter in the original edition. 0 9 Second, the developments in the law that already reflected the influence of the original edition had to be incorporated by the subsequent editions.
Finally, the 1982 edition was published so recently that it has
not yet supplanted the original as a significant factor in the overall
historical development of the law. For example, the area of the
scope of state power in Indian country was largely developed to its
present form before the 1982 edition became available. Of
course, the 1982 edition is now frequently cited in federal Indian
law cases and is unquestionably destined to influence the field over
time.
208. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 170-71 (1973)
(quoting DEPT. OF INTERIOR, supra note 202); id. at 172 n.7 (citing DEPT. OF INTERIOR, supra

note 202); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 n.4, 220 n.5 (1959) (citing DEPT. OF INTERIOR,
supra note 202).
209. See DEPT. OF INTERIOR, supra note 202, at 501-14. The only difference between
the 1958 edition and the original edition is that the six subsections of the last section in the
chapter of the original edition, which related to specific factual possibilities, have been
condensed into four subsections. The first three subsections in the 1958 edition are the
same as the first three in the original edition. The last three subsections, disregarding the
summary, are condensed under the heading of "non-Indian activities." Compare id. with
supra text accompanying notes 127-35.
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C. Implications and Ironies
Comparing Cohen's realism-ethical functionalism-with
his Handbook of Federal Indian Law-with its narrow factual categories, loose standards, lack of transcendental principles, and
strong ethical concerns for Native Americans-has revealed striking similarities, suggesting that the Handbook reflects Cohen's
brand of realist jurisprudence. Not coincidentally, in the area of
the scope of state power in Indian country, federal Indian law has
adopted a strong realist approach. In that area, the Court now
makes a particularized inquiry into the unique facts of each case,
focusing on a balance of federal, tribal, and state interests. Previously overarching principles, such as tribal sovereignty and congressional intent, are now merely factors that influence the balance-they are no longer determinative principles. Moreover,
recent developments in Supreme Court doctrine on tribal sovereignty illustrate that this realist trend in federal Indian law is
spreading beyond the field of state power in Indian country. Tribal sovereignty-the right of tribes to govern their members and
territories-has traditionally been a broad and fundamental principle. The Supreme Court has held that tribal sovereignty is not
derived from the federal government; instead, tribal powers are
"inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been
extinguished." ' 10 Furthermore, "Indian tribes still possess those
aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by
implication as a necessary result of their dependent status [on the
federal government]. '11
Despite these Supreme Court endorsements of broad tribal
powers, two recent cases suggest that the Court has begun to approach questions of tribal sovereignty with a more fact-oriented
or realist method that is weakening tribal power. In Montana v.
United States,2112 decided in 1981, the Court held that the Crow
tribe lacked the power to regulate hunting and fishing by nonIndians on non-Indian fee land located within reservation boundaries. The Court reasoned that the "exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to con210. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978) (quoting F. COHEN, supra
note 1, at 122 (emphasis deleted)).
211. Id. at 323; see Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
212. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
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trol internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of
the tribes, and so cannot survive without express congressional
delegation."21 3
Then, in 1983, Rice v. Rehner214 held that the significance of
the backdrop of tribal sovereignty in preemption cases is undermined if the tribe does not have a history of regulating the disputed field. Thus, the Court held in Rice that tribal sovereignty
was not significant to its determination of whether Congress had
preempted state liquor regulations because the tribe had not historically regulated the sale of liquor on its reservation. 215 The
Court, by suggesting that tribal sovereignty does not extend to
activities other than those that have been historically regulated by
a tribe, is establishing a trend that, if continued, will require an ad
hoc factual inquiry to determine the scope of tribal power in each
judicial decision regarding tribal sovereignty. Thus, the realist
trend in federal Indian law may be most evident in the field of the
scope of state power in Indian country, but it is not limited to that
field.
The development of the law along this realist path, particularly with respect to state power in Indian country, reflects the
significance of the Handbook, which in turn reflects Cohen's realism. The Handbook directly influenced attorneys, judges, and administrators, and further served as a catalyst allowing other factors to push the law in realist directions. Thus, federal Indian law
today reflects the significance of Cohen's jurisprudence: his realist
or functional methodology has significantly shaped the development of the law. Indeed, Cohen's influence on federal Indian law
illustrates that jurisprudential ideology can, and sometimes does,
significantly affect the course of the law in the courts.
The importance of Cohen's work is a monument to his scholarship and dedication. Nonetheless, the success of his work is
somewhat tempered by painful ironies. Cohen unquestionably supported tribal self-government and believed that the protection of
Native American cultures from the dominance of the majority society was an ethically significant problem. Overall, Cohen's work
213. Id. at 564. The Court, however, ignored Montana in Merrion v. JicarillaApache
Tribe, decided in 1982, where it held that the tribe had the power to impose a severance
tax on minerals extracted by non-Indian lessees. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
214. 463 U.S. 713 (1983).
215. Id. at 719-33.
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was undoubtedly beneficial to Native Americans. But, the law regarding the scope of state power in Indian country has developed
so that states are increasingly able to extend their power over Native Americans, thus undermining tribal self-government. 216 This
development of the law is partially due to Cohen's functional jurisprudence, as reflected in his Handbook. Thus, although Cohen
always fought on behalf of Native Americans, his realist approach
to problems of federal law has thwarted the attainment of some of
his goals. This unfortunate realization is even more ironic because
of Cohen's sensitivity to how judicial decisions and laws can ulti2
mately have effects that diverge from their purposes. 17
This irony is better understood by exploring a possible alternative approach to the problem of the scope of state power in Indian country. As discussed above, 1 8 the current stance of the law
is that the Supreme Court recognizes two independent but related
barriers to state power: federal preemption and infringement of
tribal sovereignty. These two barriers, however, have merged into
one balancing test: weighing federal and tribal interests against
state interests. Both barriers are grounded on federal power and
primarily spring from the supremacy clause of the federal
Constitution.
An alternative approach to this issue is to maintain the two
barriers, but to clarify (or change) how they are applied.2" ' One
can reasonably argue that the infringement barrier should spring
primarily from the dormant Indian commerce clause, 220 not from
the supremacy clause. Accepting this theoretical foundation for
the infringement barrier, the use of a balancing test to determine
infringement of tribal sovereignty would then be analytically or
conceptually more understandable. The Supreme Court presently
uses a balancing test to apply the dormant interstate commerce
clause-the Court weighs federal interests against state interests
to determine if a state law interferes with the dormant interstate
commerce clause. The use of a balancing test to apply the dor216. See, e.g., Rice, 463 U.S. 713 (1983); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville, 447 U.S. 134 (1980); supra text accompanying notes 186-88.
217. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 148-88, 191-95.
219. I develop this argument in Feldman, supra note 125.
220. "The Congress shall have Power... [t]o regulate Commerce... with the Indian
Tribes .
U..."
U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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mant Indian commerce clause would, therefore, be consistent with
general dormant commerce clause doctrine.
The corollary to this argument is that the application of the
Indian preemption barrier would be clarified (or changed). By referring to the infringement barrier as a dormant Indian commerce clause test and by paralleling it with dormant interstate
commerce. clause doctrine, the infringement barrier would be distanced from the preemption barrier, which would still primarily
spring from the supremacy clause. Consequently, Indian preemption law could be altered so that it would once again be conceptually consistent with preemption doctrine in other fields. That is,
Indian preemption would be based on a search for congressional
intent to preclude state law. This search for congressional intent
would be informed or guided by a backdrop of tribal sovereignty
and the special canons of construction applicable to treaties and
statutes dealing with Native Americans.
This alternative approach to the issue of the scope of state
power in Indian country is certainly vulnerable to a functionalist
attack. Hypothetically, Cohen could argue that this approach is a
slave to an empty formalism because it focuses on the conceptual
consistency of the legal system. Furthermore, a decision based on
so-called congressional intent and special canons of construction
would be transcendental nonsense. Cohen would prefer a more
candid discussion of the consequences of the legal rules and of the
actual concrete interests and values that are at stake in each isolated judicial decision.
The weakness with Cohen's hypothetical retort is that, again
ironically, it ignores the realities of judicial decision making. Cohen believed that the application of the functional method must
be accompanied by an ethical appraisal of the law. But, the Supreme Court has adopted his functional method without adopting
his ethical focus or values. If a person has particular ethical values
that he or she is seeking to advance through the law, then formalistic principles (or transcendental nonsense) might sometimes
prove to be the most effective means of attaining that goal. Courts
dislike express ethical questions and rarely discuss them explicitly.
Thus, in reality, if a court is applying a balancing test to arrive at
a decision, one factor that is unlikely to get its due consideration
is the ethical aspect of the case. Courts do not readily discuss eth-
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ics, even if they should.221
Ethical considerations, however, can be packaged into legal
principles and rules. If an advocate can convince a court to adopt
a legal rule that tacitly incorporates his or her ethical values, then,
future application of that rule will, to some extent, also be a tacit
application of those particular ethical values. I am not suggesting
that the purposes of every legal principle and rule are always manifested simply by applying that principle or rule. But, I am suggesting that, in some circumstances, a particular ethical value
might be better advanced by a formalistic legal principle or rule
than by an ad hoc balancing of interests.222 For example, in the
area of state power in Indian country, if the Court decided preemption cases by focusing on congressional intent and the special
canons of construction, the Court would tacitly but strongly advance the ethical value that the majority society owes, as a matter
of justice, a special moral duty to protect and aid Native American
tribes as compensation for past and present societal injustices, including violent coercion and psychological duress. The corollary
of this ethical value is that Native Americans have, as a matter of
justice, a moral right to maintain their independent societies and
cultures in any manner that they choose. As the law currently
stands, however, when the Court decides an Indian preemption
case, it is unlikely to explicitly discuss or to give sufficient weight
to ethical values. These values are likely to be subordinated to
more "acceptable" judicial factors, such as the economic effects of
a decision.
This discussion suggests that one should be hesitant to separate the form of legal reasoning or argument from its ethical consequences. Although the form of legal argument can strongly influence the development of the law, that influence is significant
often because of its ethical consequences. Different forms of reasoning, such as realist or formalist, might in specific circumstances
influence the attainment of certain ethical goals. With the example of Indian preemption, a formalist approach might protect the
221. Of course, there are exceptions. For example, in a dissent in a federal Indian law
case, Justice Black wrote: "I regret that this court is to be the governmental agency that
breaks faith with this dependent people. Great nations, like great men, should keep their
word." Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142 (1960)
(Black, J., dissenting).
222. See Wilson, The Morality of Formalism, 33 UCLA L. REv. 431, 482 (1985).
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rights of Native Americans better than a realist approach. The
formal question of what type of reasoning to use is, however, less
significant than the substantive question of whether certain ethical
goals are attained. The significance of the form of argument
arises from its ethical consequences. Unfortunately for Native
Americans, the Supreme Court has adopted Cohen's functional
method with respect to the issue of state power in Indian country,
but the Court has not embraced his ethical values about Native
Americans. Without Cohen's ethical values, his functional
method, as expressed in the balancing test of contemporary Indian preemption law, facilitates judicial decisions that undermine
Native American rights.
This leads to another ironic element of Cohen's work, though
this element has had a less tangible influence upon federal Indian
law. Cohen clearly was sensitive to the differences between cultures and loathed the notion of one government imposing its beliefs upon another government. Despite this conviction, Cohen
also believed in a hedonistic utilitarian ethics and a functional
methodology that together entailed social engineering. Social engineering, however, necessarily requires some people imposing
their value judgments onto others-that is, social engineering dictates that supposed experts determine the fates of other people.
Such a social methodology has frightening potential for a minority
such as Native Americans: a utilitarian court or legislature will ordinarily pursue the path that promises the greatest total pleasure
for society, even if some minorities bear an unfair burden. Thus,
for example, the termination policy of the 1950s, when Congress
sought to force Native Americans to assimilate into the majority
society by withdrawing recognition of tribal entities,223 could theoretically be justified as increasing the total pleasure of society
even though it injured Native Americans.
Cohen, however, clearly did not believe that tribes should be
forced to assimilate into the majority society. Cohen might even
hypothetically argue that social engineering could be used on the
majority society to influence it to accept continuing and powerful
tribal sovereignty, but he would be hard pressed to convince anyone that this tactic would increase the overall pleasure of society.
223. See F. COHEN, supra note 105, at 152-80; see, e.g., H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong.
1st Sess., 99 CONG. REQ 9968 (1953).
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This inconsistency in Cohen's work suggests that although he expressly argued for a consequentialist ethics in the form of hedonistic utilitarianism, he also tacitly followed a more intuitive or deontological ethical approach.224 This intuitionist morality may have
been the basis for his lifelong support of minorities, especially Native Americans.2 25 Thus, Cohen's ethical stance concerning Native
Americans-that, as a matter of justice, the majority society owes
a duty to protect and aid Native Americans because of past societal wrongs-was probably based more on an intuitive ethical
framework than on a true utilitarian calculation.22 6
This recognition of the inconsistency in Cohen's ethics suggests a final ironic conclusion. One can argue that the Supreme
Court has not only explicitly adopted Cohen's functional methodology but has also implicitly adopted his utilitarian ethics as manifested in the balancing test for state power in Indian country. By
balancing the various interests at stake in a case, the Court attempts to maximize the total pleasure of the society. That this approach may lead to results that are inconsistent with Cohen's
more intuitive ethical values about Native Americans is problematic. Thus, the fact that Cohen did not expressly acknowledge the
more intuitive elements of his ethical framework may have prevented him from envisioning how his functional methodology
227
could subvert Native American rights.
224. See generally J. RAWLs, A THEORY

OF JUSTICE

30 (1971) (discusses deontological

ethics); J. SMART & B. WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 5 (1973) (same).
225. For example, Cohen characterized one of the ethical issues in federal Indian law
cases as a "question of the right of the powerful to take from the weak," and called this
question "theological." F. COHEN, Judicial Ethics, supra note 62, at 164.
226.

See supra text accompanying note 117.

227. The ironies of Cohen's work should alert and sensitize future advocates of Native
Americans to the impacts of a judicial decision for the future of their tribal or Native
American clients. The importance of winning one case today should not overshadow the
significance of the decision to the long-range interests of the client as well as of all Native
Americans. Certainly, an advocate should always seek to win every case, but in federal
Indian law, one must be especially sensitive to the implications of one's arguments for the
future development of the field. For example, cases such as Williams v. Lee and White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker were decisions that the Native Americans won, but the reasoning of the decisions ultimately led to greater state incursions into Indian country. See Comment, supra note 125, at 565-74.
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CONCLUSION

This study of Felix S. Cohen's jurisprudence, his Handbook of
Federal Indian Law, and the development of federal Indian law revolves around two general points: jurisprudential ideology can influence the development of the law in the courts, and this influence is significant often because of its ethical consequences. One
should, therefore, be wary of discussing forms of legal argument
apart from their ethical consequences.
More specifically, this study reveals a previously unrecognized
but nonetheless significant influence on the development of federal Indian law: namely, Cohen's realist jurisprudence. In particular, the Supreme Court has largely adopted Cohen's functional approach to the problem of the scope of state power in Indian
country. The Court now weighs federal and tribal interests
against state interests to determine whether state law should be
upheld in Indian country.
Even though Cohen was a strong advocate for Native Americans, the Court's use of his functional approach has to some extent facilitated the weakening of Native American rights. In a dispute over state power in Indian country, the most significant
factor favoring Native Americans is a commitment to their ethical
right to maintain their independent societies and cultures in any
manner that they choose. This ethical right is a matter of justice
and is based on past societal wrongs inflicted by the majority society. Such an ethical factor, however, is unlikely to be expressly
considered or given sufficient weight in the current balancing test
for determining the scope of state power.
In some circumstances, Cohen's functional methodology may
be an effective means to attain certain goals. In the context of
federal Indian law, however, a functional approach may be particularly harmful to Native Americans and Indian advocates. For
tribes to prosper culturally, federal Indian law uniquely needs to
develop broad doctrines that could theoretically govern cases and
lead to, or at least facilitate, results that favor tribal independence. As long as cases are decided ad hoc, with a focus on the
nonethical interests at stake, tribes are likely to continue to have
their powers slowly eroded under the constant pressures of the
economic, political, and cultural forces of the majority society.

